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ABSTRACT 
 
The challenges to stability, unity, and democracy in Iraq are 
typically characterized as factional (sectarian and ethnic) or as struggle 
against the presence of foreign troops. However, this assumption remains 
largely erroneous. The problems and challenges in Iraq are actually and 
overwhelmingly the result of power struggles, and the competition for 
resources by political elites, and dominant political factions.  
 The political and electoral system emplaced in Iraq incentivizes 
elites and political entities to undertake factional identities; in doing so, 
it promotes identity politics.  The current system also fails to filter the 
contests for power through the electoral system.  As such, fragmentation 
within the government is maximized, and the political system in Iraq 
becomes one that promotes extremism and incorporates extremist views, 
thus, creating paralysis and hindering progress. 
  Consequently, this study proposes redesigning the Iraqi electoral 
system in a way that compels elites to secure cross-factional support.  
Such an approach will force political elites and candidates to undertake 
median and moderate approaches to win and will promote moderate 
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elites who must gain the support of the people.  This will allow 
reconciliation efforts to progress steadily and will put Iraq on the right 
path for consolidating its nascent democracy.  Vitally important, such a 
system will provide for democratic consolidation and sustainability 
without the need of external interference.  The challenge, however, is in 
deciding how to introduce such an institutional redesign due to 
entrenched interests of parties and elites that are served under the 
current system. 
 The current political system in Iraq is parliamentarian; it follows the 
concept of infusion of powers and is based on ―consensus‖ and informal 
consociation. The electoral system in Iraq is a closed-party-list 
proportional representation.  This study proposes an alternative political 
and electoral system.  As a substitute political system, this study 
proposes a hybrid system that largely follows the concept of separation of 
powers.  Under this system the chief executive—as opposed to the head 
of state—will be directly elected by the people through a customized 
majoritarian system that conditions victory in elections not only on 
achieving 50+% of the vote, but also on achieving certain thresholds in 
16 out of the 18 Iraqi provinces. Thus, only candidates who are 
acceptable to all the ―components‖ of Iraqi society will assume the 
responsibility of governing Iraq.   
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 The Presidency Council—the head of state—can follow the 
consociational principle, and remain as it is now. At present, the 
presidency council in Iraq—which will give over power to a President in 
the next elections—consists of a President and two Vice Presidents. The 
presidency council‘s members are representatives of the three major 
components of the Iraqi society—Shiite, Sunni, and, Kurd.  This can 
remain unchanged, voted in by parliament.  In fact, preserving this 
would check the strong Prime Minister proposed under this system. As 
such, transparency, accountability, decisiveness, and cohesion, will be 
combined with oversight.   
 As for elections to the legislature, this study proposes to convert the 
electoral rules to single-member districts.  Districts must be delineated 
in such a way that candidates will largely compete against people of their 
own (sectarian or ethnic) identity.  Hence, candidates will be unable to 
invoke their identities as credentials to win elections.  Where possible, 
minorities in districts will be included so that serious candidates 
competing against others from their-own identity will be forced to appeal 
also to people other than their identities. This will further compel 
candidates to undertake moderate stands. 
 Essentially, the proposed system enhances the accountability of 
elected officials to the electorate; it promotes substantive politics rather 
than descriptive politics in Iraq; and it allows for the steady consolidation 
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of democracy.  The proposed system also maintains unity within the 
executive branch, and opens the way for reconciliation, reconstruction, 
the provision of services and security, and political stability. 
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The strategic objective of Operation Iraq Freedom (OIF) was to 
establish constitutional democracy in a unified and stable Iraq, and to 
facilitate the Iraqi society‘s embrace of free market capitalism as well as 
social moderation, tolerance, and pluralism, to include respect for 
human, minority and women‘s rights.  The international policy vision 
informing the plan was to institute changes that would start a domino 
effect of democratization cascading throughout the Middle East.1  
Operation Iraqi Freedom after a spectacular success in the initial 
military phase, turned into a chronic security problem,2 and after more 
than six years, has yet to achieve its objectives.3  There remain many 
security challenges in Iraq, for example: sectarian and ethnic tensions 
are rampant, and serious human rights violations remain very common:4  
                                                             
1 Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra Ii: The inside Story of the 
Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, First ed. (New York: Random House Inc., Pantheon 
Books, 2006).  73 & 433.  And:  Peter W. Galbraith, The End of Iraq (New York: Simon & 
Schuster Paperbacks, 2006).  5, 9 & 10. 
 
2 Colonel Jabbar Naeemah Karam, ―Post-Transition Violence in Iraq (2004-2005): The 
Military Perspective of an Insider‖ (U.S. Army War College, 2006). 5. 
 
3 James A. Baker III and others, The Iraq Study Group Report (United States Institute for 
Peace, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Center for the 
Study of the Presidency (CSP), and the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at 
Rice University, 2006). 9 ―Saddam Hussein has been removed from power and the Iraqi 
people have a democratically elected government that is broadly representative of Iraq‘s 
population, yet the government is not adequately advancing national reconciliation, 
providing basic security, or delivering essential services. The level of violence is high 
and growing. There is great suffering ….‖ 
 
4 "Iraq: Torture Continues at Hands of New Government : Police Systematically Abusing 
Detainees", Human Rights Watch http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2005/01/24/iraq-
torture-continues-hands-new-government (accessed 03/29/ 2009).   And:  Peter 
Beaumont, "Abuse Worse Than under Saddam, Says Iraqi Leader," The Guardian, 
11/27/ 2005.    And:  Human Rights Report  1 January – 30 June 2008, (UN Assistance 
Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), 2008). 2 ―grave human rights violations that are less widely 
reported, and the elimination of which requires long-term political commitment remain 
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The country appears heading towards a theocracy rather than a 
democracy,5 and, acts of violence committed by non-state actors in all of 
its forms—terrorism,6 insurgency,7 and, militias—are still very much of a 
threat to Iraq‘s stability.8   
Everyone knowledgeable of the situation recognizes that politics is 
at the heart of such challenges and forms of violence.9  As presented by 
the Iraq Study groups: 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
unaddressed.‖  And:  "Un: Human Rights Abuses in Iraq Still Widespread  ", Voice of 
America http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2008-12/2008-12-02-
voa66.cfm?CFID=152390694&CFTOKEN=29163464&jsessionid=883095ddcec5e6eb864
0343c664b3c2f78b5 (accessed 03/26/ 2009).  And: III and others. 13 ―Iraqi police 
cannot control crime, and they routinely engage in sectarian violence, including the 
unnecessary detention, torture, and targeted execution of Sunni Arab civilians. The 
police are organized under the Ministry of the Interior, which is confronted by 
corruption and militia infiltration and lacks control over police in the provinces.‖  And: 
"Iraqi V.P. Calls for Forming Nat''L Gov''T to Salvage Country", Kuwait News Agency 
(KUNA) 
http://www.kuna.net.kw/NewsAgenciesPublicSite/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=1958809&La
nguage=en (accessed 01/28/ 2009). Reported that Iraqi Vice President Tarik Al-Hashimi 
―noted that human rights conditions in Iraq were ‗regrettable.‘‖    And:  Hope and Fear: 
Human Rights in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, (Amnesty International 2009). 
 
5 Peter Grier, "Democracy's Push, Theocracy's Pull - in War's Wake: Is the Middle East 
Bound for Resurgence of Radical Islam?," The Christian Science Monitor, 04/24/ 2003. 
and, "Iraq's Permanent Constitution:  Analysis and Recommendations  ", United States 
Commission on International Religious Freedom 
http://www.uscirf.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1888&Itemid=1 
(accessed). And, Darrell Williams, "Iraq Is Now a Shiite Islamic Theocracy, Thanks to 
Bush", American Chronicle http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/40367 
(accessed 10/29 2008).   
 
6 Human Security Brief 2006, (Vancouver: The University of British Columbia - LIU 
Institute For Global Issues, 2006). 3. 
 
7 Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq,  General David H. Petraeus Commander, 
Multi-National Force-Iraq, (Washington DC, 2007).  2. 
 
8 Ibid. 2. 
 
9 Counterinsurgency Operations Field Manual–Interim No. 3-07.22, (Washington, DC: 
Headquarters Department of the Army, 2004).   1-1      and:   "Testimony of Dr. Ahmed 
S. Hashim," in U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, The Senate (Washington D.C.: 
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If the Iraqi government moves forward with 
national reconciliation, Iraqis will have an opportunity 
for a better future, terrorism will be dealt a blow, 
stability will be enhanced in an important part of the 
world, and America‘s credibility, interests, and values 
will be protected.10 
In January 2007, former President George W. Bush announced a 
military surge to provide a ―breathing space‖ for the Iraqi political 
progress.11 Eventually, the security situation improved in Iraq.12  Experts 
inside and outside of government agree that the progress in Iraq is 
remarkable13 (see figures 1, 2, 3).   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
2004). 2&3  and:  Bob Woodward, The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-
2008 (New York: Simon & Schuster 2008). 234 the Defense Department team‘s  
 
10 III and others.  6. 
 
11 "Transcript of President Bush‘s Address to the Nation on U.S. Policy in Iraq," New 
York Times, 01/11/ 2007. 1.  Also see:  "Fact Sheet: The New Way Forward in Iraq", 
National Defense University - Military Education Research Library Network (MERLN) 
http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/iraq/WH/20070110-3.pdf (accessed 02/28/ 2009).    
This is an abstraction the surge was one factor.  However, the remaining actors are 
irrelevant to this paper.  and see: Woodward.  213. 
 
12 Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq,  General David H. Petraeus Commander, 
Multi-National Force-Iraq. 1.  And:  Guy Raz, "Gates: Political Developments in Iraq 
Discouraging," NPR, 08/03/ 2007.   See also:  "War in Iraq, Plan for Ending the War in 
Iraq - the Problem", BarackObama.com http://origin.barackobama.com/issues/iraq/ 
(accessed 11/18/ 2008).  And:  "Remarks of President Barack Obama – Responsibly 
Ending the War in Iraq (Camp Lejeune, North Carolina)", The White House 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-Obama-
Responsibly-Ending-the-War-in-Iraq/ (accessed 02/28/ 2009).  ―Thanks in great 
measure to your service, the situation in Iraq has improved. Violence has been reduced 
substantially from the horrific sectarian killing of 2006 and 2007.  Al Qaeda in Iraq has 
been dealt a serious blow by our troops and Iraq‘s Security Forces, and through our 
partnership with Sunni Arabs. The capacity of Iraq‘s Security Forces has improved, and 
Iraq‘s leaders have taken steps toward political accommodation. The relative peace and 
strong participation in January‘s provincial elections sent a powerful message to the 
world about how far Iraqis have come in pursuing their aspirations through a peaceful 
political process. But let there be no doubt: Iraq is not yet secure, and there will be 
difficult days ahead. Violence will continue to be a part of life in Iraq.‖  And: James 
Kirkup, "Iraq: Basra Is Less Dangerous Than Manchester, British General Says," Daily 
Telegraph, 02/07/ 2009. 
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This progress, whether on the security or the political levels, is the 
result of tireless efforts and external pressures mainly exerted by the 
United States over Iraqi political elites,14 with numerous benchmarks 
and milestones imposed.15  The necessity of these actions indicates that 
the progress is not sustainable:16 military commanders and top American 
officials in Iraq fear an eventual collapse in Iraq,17 and analysts agree 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
13 Stephen Biddle, Michael E. O'Hanlon, and Kenneth M. Pollack, "The Evolution of Iraq 
Strategy," in Restoring the Balance a Middle East Strategy for the Next President 
(Washington DC: Brookings Institution and The Council on Foreign Relations 2008). 27   
and: Fred Burton and Scott Stewart, The Second Cold War and Corporate Security 
(Strasfor, 2008). iii. 
 
14 Woodward. 188 ―most state institutions were minimally functional without U.S. 
direction and support,‖ 191, 200, 211, & 216. 
 
15 Ibid.  256  and:  "U.S. Aircraft Opens Fire on Sons of Iraq Members," The Washington 
Post, 04/03/ 2009.  ―Under heavy pressure from the U.S. military, the Shiite-led Iraqi 
government agreed to assume responsibility for the payments to the predominantly 
Sunni armed groups and absorb some of them into its security forces.    But in recent 
weeks, several Sons of Iraq groups have disintegrated and some members have rejoined 
the insurgency, saying the government has failed to pay them on time and has been 
slow to admit them into police academies.‖ 
 
16 Woodward.  192 & 237 David Gordon the representative from the Intelligence 
community‘s opinion   and:   Thomas E. Ricks, "The War in Iraq Isn't Over. The Main 
Events May Not Even Have Happened Yet.," The Washington Post, 02/15/ 2009.   And:  
Mustafa Mahmoud, "Feud Delays Iraq Committee Kirkuk Recommendations," Reuters, 
03/29/ 2009.  And:  Charles Levinson, "Toll Rises as Iraq Slows Surge," Wall Street 
Journal, 05/08/ 2009. ―Violence is on the rise in Iraq as American troops withdraw. A 
ground-level look at the handover provides one explanation: The Iraqi government is 
neglecting many of the successful counterinsurgency initiatives it is inheriting from the 
U.S. military.‖ 
 
17 "Pentagon Brass Chafes at Obama's Iraq Pullout Plan," The Daily Star, 02/03/ 2009.  
And: "Submitted Statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee - as Submitted by 
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Room Sd-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, 
Washington, D.C., Tuesday, January 27, 2009 ", U.S. Department of Defense 
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1337 (accessed 01/29/ 
2009).    And:  Peter Baker and Thom Shanker, "Obama Meets with Officials on Iraq, 
Signaling His Commitment to Ending War " The New York Times, 01/21/ 2009.  And:  
Peter Baker and Alissa J. Rubin, "Obama Pledge on Iraq Encounters Opposition," 
International Herald Tribune, 01/29/ 2009.  And: Elisabeth Bumiller and Thom 
Shanker, "Military Planners, in Nod to Obama, Are Preparing for a Faster Iraq 
Withdrawal," The New York Times, 01/14/ 2009.  And: Martin Sieff, "Obama Imposes 
His New Plans on Iraq, Afghan Wars," United Press International, Inc., 01/27/ 2009.  
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that the progress in Iraq remains ―fragile and reversible.‖18  Essentially, 
now as previously, the political progress remains the major hurdle in 
achieving the strategic objective of OIF.19  The Baker/Hamilton Iraq 
Study group summarized: 
There is widespread Iraqi, American, and 
international agreement on the key issues confronting 
the Iraqi government: national reconciliation, including 
the negotiation of a ―political deal‖ among Iraq‘s 
sectarian groups on Constitution review, de-
Baathification, oil revenue sharing … the future of 
Kirkuk, and amnesty; security, particularly curbing 
militias … and governance, including the provision of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Military commanders, expert bureaucrats, and civil servants.  They have argued against 
the preferences of the President and provided other alternatives.  General Raymond 
Odierno the Commanding General of the Multi National Forces in Iraq and highest 
ranking General there, General David Petraeous the CENTCOM commander.  And, 
Secretary Gates aligns himself with the military commanders, fearing a collapse in Iraq.  
In general, top and middle ranking military officers in Iraq see a quick withdrawal from 
Iraq as destabilizing, and would reverse gains achieved in that country.  And: Anthony 
Shadid, "Departing U.S. Envoy in Iraq Sees Risks Ahead - Crocker Warns against 
Abrupt Troop Withdrawal," The Washington Post, 01/23/ 2009.  Ryan Crocker who 
recently left his post in Iraq as the American Ambassador, strongly warned of some 
―very serious risks‖ that a hasty troops withdrawal from Iraq entails. These risks were 
summarized as: security breakdown, a reversal of the political progress that has been 
made, and, chaos. Crocker warned that such a withdrawal would send the wrong 
message to the Iraqi people and political factions, which would force them to go back 
and entrench themselves in order to be prepared of what is next. 
 
18 Shadid.  And: Burton and Stewart. Iv   and:  Michael J. Sodaro, Comparative Politics: 
A Global Introduction 3rd Edition ed. (New York: McGraw Hill Companies, 2008). 267.  
And: Biddle, O'Hanlon, and Pollack. 29 
 
19 "Remarks of President Barack Obama – Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq (Camp 
Lejeune, North Carolina)",   (accessed).   And:  "U.S. To Be 'More Aggressive' with Iraq on 
Political Reform," AFP, 02/27/ 2009.   And:  Raz.   And:  "War in Iraq, Plan for Ending 
the War in Iraq - the Problem",   (accessed). ―despite the improved security situation, 
the Iraqi government has not stepped forward to lead the Iraqi people and to reach the 
genuine political accommodation that was the stated purpose of the surge … the 
absence of genuine political accommodation in Iraq.‖   And:  Matthew Duss and Peter 
Juul, The Fractured Shia of Iraq: Understanding the Tensions within Iraq’s Majority 
(Washington DC: Center for American Progress, January 2009). 2 ―The U.S. troop surge 
in Iraq in 2007 and 2008 was intended to provide the political space for reconciliation 
among the Kurds and Sunni and Shia Arabs, which remains elusive.‖ 
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basic services and the rollback of pervasive 
corruption.20 
Since taking power in January 2009, the Obama administration 
has been shifting from the military and security aspects21 to focus 
primarily on the political progress in Iraq.  President Obama recognized 
that ―the long-term solution in Iraq must be political – not military‖22  
and summarized the challenges in the statement: ―too many 
fundamental political questions about Iraq‘s future remain unresolved 
....‖23 Vice President Joseph Robinette Biden, Jr has also emphasized a 
political approach to end the war on Iraq24 in his remarks ―the United 
States would prod Iraq's government on forging political reform.‖25  He 
said that the US has to be ―much more aggressive ... forcing Iraqis to 
deal with those issues.‖26  Ambassador Christopher Hill stated that his 
priority in Iraq would be ―buttressing its still-shaky government.‖27 
                                                             
20 III and others. 16.   Also see: Woodward. 223. 
 
21 "Remarks of President Barack Obama – Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq (Camp 
Lejeune, North Carolina)",   (accessed). ―President Barack Obama announced his plan to 
end the war in Iraq.  By August 31, 2010 the US ―combat mission in Iraq will end.‖  
And, by the end of 2011 and according the status of forces agreement, all the troops—
even the residual force will be pulled out of Iraq.‖ 
 
22 Ibid.,   (accessed). 
 
23 Ibid.,   (accessed). 
 
24 "U.S. To Be 'More Aggressive' with Iraq on Political Reform." 
 
25 Ibid. 
 
26 Ibid. 
 
27 "Obama's Envoy Pick: Iran Is Real Problem for Iraq," AFP, 03/25/ 2009. 
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Political reform to promote a sustainable and self-reinforcing 
progress in Iraq is the foundation of the Obama administration‘s new 
strategy for victory in Iraq.  The strategy, as announced by the Obama 
administration states: 
This strategy is grounded in a clear and achievable 
goal shared by the Iraqi people and the American people: an 
Iraq that is sovereign, stable, and self-reliant … To achieve 
that goal, we will work to promote an Iraqi government that 
is just, representative, and accountable, … a strong political, 
diplomatic, and civilian effort on our part can advance 
progress and help lay a foundation for lasting peace and 
security … We can serve as an honest broker in pursuit of fair 
and durable agreements on issues that have divided Iraq’s 
leaders. And just as we will support Iraq‘s Security Forces, 
we will help Iraqi institutions strengthen their capacity to 
protect the rule of law, confront corruption, and deliver basic 
services ….28  
Basically, this study argues that achieving the original goal of OIF 
and the outcome intended by the military surge, and fulfilling the goals 
of the Obama administration‘s strategy in Iraq will require ―reforming the 
decision making process‖29 in Iraq through reforming the ―formal 
electoral rules‖30 and mechanisms.31  This course of action is imperative 
                                                             
28 "Remarks of President Barack Obama – Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq (Camp 
Lejeune, North Carolina)",   (accessed).  
 
29 Deborah Stone, Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making, Revised Edition 
ed. (New York  and London: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2002).  355. 
 
30 Pippa Norris, Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior (Cambridge 
University Press, 2004). 7 ―formal electoral rules are understood here as the legislative 
framework governing elections, as embodies in official documents, constitutional 
conventions, legal statues, codes of conduct, and administrative procedures, authorized 
by law and enforceable by courts.‖  Also see:  Stone.  287 ―rules create rather surprising 
incentives to assume particular identities.‖  And:  Paul Pierson, Politics in Time:  History, 
Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton University Press, 2004). 1 & 104. 
 
31 Stone.  354 & 367 ―Mechanic the metaphor suggests taking our policy problems to a 
mechanic rather than fighting them out in a political contest. By focusing on ends 
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since ―electoral systems are commonly regarded as some of the most 
basic democratic structures, from which much else follows.‖32   
Therefore, in Chapter One, this study will demonstrate that the 
essence of the problem in Iraq lies in the nature and actions of the Iraqi 
elites.33 Chapter Two, analyzes the current political structure and 
electoral system in Iraq, demonstrating how the political and electoral 
system in Iraq institutionalizes the actions of these elites and facilitates 
the enhancement of factional identities.   
The reform advocated in this study is inspired by the American 
experience during the revision of the Articles of Confederation and the 
Constitutional Convention.  Consequently, Chapter Three explores the 
American experience during this specific, constitution-building era and 
draws parallels between the current situation in Iraq and the challenges 
the US faced after its Declaration of Independence, incorporating lessons 
from the American experience and demonstrating how those lessons 
inform the strategy advocated here. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(better for what?) rather than distribution (better for whom) this approach conceals 
questions of power.  Problems of authority are converted into a matter of technical 
requirement.‖  
 
32 Norris. 3. 
 
33 III and others. 15 ―The composition of the Iraqi government is basically sectarian, and 
key players within the government too often act in their sectarian interest. Iraq‘s Shia, 
Sunni, and Kurdish leaders frequently fail to demonstrate the political will to act in 
Iraq‘s national interest, and too many Iraqi ministries lack the capacity to govern 
effectively. The result is an even weaker central government than the constitution 
provides.‖  & 20 ―too many political leaders still pursue their personal, sectarian, or 
party interests.‖ 
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Chapter Four, building on previous discussion, advocates a 
substitute electoral system for Iraq that will provide remedies to the 
problems stated in Chapter Two.  It is strongly informed by the 
statement: 
Electoral reform is founded upon the principle that 
altering the formal rules matters based on the assumption 
that certain desirable consequences for certain social and 
political engineering can be achieved.34   
Hence, the proposed reformation aims at reshaping the ―form and 
membership of the decision-making body,‖35 by changing ―who makes 
the decision‖ to reshape the outcome in Iraq.36  This study concludes 
that even though the advocated system entails difficulties; nevertheless, 
it will provide the most efficacious overall approach—given the context of 
Iraqi specificities—to the range of problems facing Iraq. 
It is important to remember that without solid and steady political 
progress in Iraq, America will win every battle and gain victories on the 
tactical and operational levels, but will never win the war and achieve its 
strategic objective. Therefore, this study proposes a system that will forge 
consensus among the Iraqi people rather than the political elites.  
Furthermore, the institutional reforms advocated in this study will, as is 
demonstrated, produce a lasting mechanism that will channel the Iraqi 
efforts to compete through democratic institutions, under the conviction 
                                                             
34 Norris. 5. 
 
35 Stone.  356. 
 
36 Ibid. 355. 
10 
 
that the attempts to establish democracy will only be ―consolidated when 
most conflicts are processed through democratic institutions.‖37  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
37 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in 
Eastern Europe and Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).  51. 
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Chapter I:  
The Essence of the Problem in Iraq And Means To Mitigate It 
Shifting the focus from military and security to political issues, is 
indeed the right path.  Violence in Iraq is typically characterized as being 
either against an occupying force, or factional (sectarian and ethnic).  
While the elements of such motivations are present, and indeed are 
responsible for some problems, nevertheless, this assumption remains 
largely erroneous.38  Sectarian and ethnic strife is not the primary cause 
of violence,39 nor is the presence of foreign troops.  The main driver of 
violence in Iraq is the struggle for power40 and competition for resources 
by political elites.41    
                                                             
38 "Review: Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity," International 
Organization 54, no. 4 (2000). 855 ―observers may be concluding too quickly that 
popular involvement in "ethnic violence" and support for extremist leaders is motivated 
in a straightforward fashion by underlying ethnic animosities and fears‖  and:  
Woodward.  244 General George Casey‘s statement ―the current conflict in Iraq is as 
much about division of political and economic power as it is sectarian violence.‖ 
 
39 Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: 
Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore and London: 
The John Hopkins University Press, 1996). 20, 21, 22, 30, & 35. 
 
40 Paul Risley and Timothy D. Sisk, Policy Options on Democratic Reform, Democracy and 
United Nations Peace-Building at the Local Level: Lessons Learned (Stockholm: 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance  (IDEA), 2005). 8 ―‗At the 
centre of virtually every conflict is the State and its power—who controls it and how it is 
used. No conflict can be resolved without answering those questions, and nowadays the 
answers almost always have to be democratic ones, at least in form…. Democracy is 
practiced in many ways, and none of them is perfect. But at its best it provides a means 
for managing and resolving disputes peacefully, in an atmosphere of mutual trust‘‖  
and: Timothy D. Sisk, Pathway of the Political: Electoral Processes after Civil War, 
Discussion Draft for Research Partnership on Postwar State-Building. (Denver: University 
of Denver, 2006).   And:  Sisk; Sameer N. Yacoub, "Iraqi Prime Minister Lectures against 
Sectarianism," AP, 01/25/ 2009.  Prime Minister Maliki‘s statement "The constitution 
has not called for the division of the country, but the people who have the ambition to 
create their own mini-state here and there were behind such practices,"  and: 
12 
 
Elections and their aftermath promise to be 
contentious and potentially bloody as Iraq‘s three main 
ethnic and religious groups—the … Kurds and Sunni 
Arabs and the … Shia Arabs—vie for power. More 
troubling still, factions within each of these ethnic and 
sectarian groups will contend for power in the regions 
they dominate—using local patronage and control of 
Iraq‘s resources, revenues, and guns, as well as appeals 
based on longstanding religious traditions in Iraq ….42 
In his book, Paul Bremer‘s description of several encounters with 
the Iraqi Governing Council (GC) members—who were trying to secure ―a 
piece of the pie,‖43 the pie being Iraq44—nicely proves this point.45 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Mohammad Akef Jamal, "Victim of Quota System", Gulf News 
http://www.gulfnews.com/opinion/columns/region/10275537.html (accessed 02/25/ 
2009).  And: Woodward. 186, 187, 189, 242 The opinion of General George Casey the 
MNFI commander in Iraq: ―there is a struggle for division of power between Iraqis.‖  
And:  Duss and Juul. 1 ―On January 31, 2009, Iraqis will vote in the country‘s first 
provincial elections in four years. These elections will deliver a preliminary verdict on 
the vigorous and often violent competition between Iraq‘s contending political factions, 
and help shape the contours of Iraq‘s future.‖  And: Sodaro. 264.  And:  Ghaith Abdul-
Ahad, "Six Years after Saddam Hussein, Nouri Al-Maliki Tightens His Grip on Iraq," The 
Guardian, 04/30/ 2009.  Three officers from the Iraqi National Intelligence Service 
(INSI) stated that: ―It‘s not about sects any more its about the party, the interest of the 
party.‖ 
 
41 Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq,  General David H. Petraeus Commander, 
Multi-National Force-Iraq.  ―The fundamental source of the conflict in Iraq is competition 
among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources.‖ And: Cynthia J. 
Arnson and L. William Zartman, Rethinking the Economics of War, the Intersection of 
Need, Cree, and, Greed (Washington The Woodrow Wilson International Center For 
Scholars, 2005). 3 ―David Keen ‗war is not simply a breakdown in a particular system, 
but a way of creating an alternative system of profit, power and even protection.‘‖  And:  
III and others. 19 ―The security situation cannot improve unless leaders act in support 
of national reconciliation.‖ 
 
42 Duss and Juul. 1 & 2.  Also see: Biddle, O'Hanlon, and Pollack. 39.  And:  Sam 
Dagher, "Iraqi Report on Corruption Cites Prosecutors‘ Barriers," The New York Times, 
05/05/ 2009.  And:  Steven Lee Myers, "Iraqi Forces: Rebuilt and Stronger, but Still 
Stumbling," The New York Times, 05/07/ 2009. 
 
43 L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 2006). 148 & 149. 
 
44 Ibid.  296, & 303. 
 
45 Ibid. Presented with an understanding of the risk of over-generalizing, and 
acknowledging that there were competent figures in the GC, or members of the GC 
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Violence in Iraq is elite led.46  Sectarian and ethnic banners are 
mainly means for these elites to mobilize support and maintain their 
struggle for power against their adversaries.47 These elites also 
indoctrinate people and manipulate their insecurities, for their—the 
political elites‘—own gains and purposes.48 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
political parties that rose to the level of responsibility after the handover of sovereignty.  
These competent figures are exceptions to the description of the elites that this paper 
portrays. The intention here is to address the group characteristic, and the outcome of 
including this group.  Keeping in mind whilst reading this study, that all the senior 
positions—President, Vice Presidents, Prime Ministers, dominant political figures inside 
and outside parliament—up until today are either occupied by members of the 
Governing Council convened by Paul Bremer, or are senior members of the parties that 
formed the GC; the following encounters reflects the point this thesis is making that the 
elites are responsible for the mischief in Iraq:  123  ―The Governing Council‘s 
effectiveness was hampered, from the first day to the last, by lax work habits.  They 
established a pattern of meeting Monday through Thursday, usually just in the 
morning, but even then not starting until after 10:00 A.M.  After treating themselves to 
a lavish luncheon, members would drift off to other activities or a long siesta in the 
baking after noon … the Governing Council worked fewer hours in a week than the CPA 
worked every day.‖  & 124 ―the one issue on which the GC did work quickly was paying 
itself … they came up with an outrageous budget for the Council … they were to have 
gasoline allowance which … will allow each member to drive fifty thousand miles a 
month … the budget that they proposed for the twenty-five member GC was more than 
that of the Education Ministry, which had more than 325,000 employees.‖  & 189 ―It 
was clear that we were reaching a crisis point on the Governing Council‘s 
ineffectiveness … the twenty four members, still split along sectarian and ethnic lines.‖  
& 195 Bremer called them the ―‗committee of the Black Hole,‘ since nothing ever 
emerged from the Council.‖ 
 
46 Jim Hoagland, "Iraq's Good Example," The Washington Post, 02/08/ 2009. 
 
47 "Review: Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity."  853.  And:             
James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors 
in Political Life," American Political Science Review 78 (September 1984). 744 ―symbolic 
behavior is also a strategic element in political competition. Individuals and groups are 
frequently hypocritical, reciting sacred myths without believing them and while violating 
their implications.  In particular, a serious theoretical understanding of myths, 
symbols, and rituals must include some attention to the dynamics of symbols, to the 
processes by which symbols shape the behavior not only of the innocent but of the 
society as a whole.‖  And: Yacoub. 
 
48 Stone. 323 ―indoctrination is defined as the intentional manipulation of opinions and 
preferences and the destruction or prevention of independent judgment … it happens in 
the everyday relation between citizens and between citizens and the states‖ & 315 
―relationship in which dominant elites control peoples beliefs and knowledge in a 
manipulative and self-interested way.  Then it is possible to see how indoctrination can 
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The ―ongoing‖49 intra-sect confrontations between rival but like-
minded religious Shiite factions for supremacy,50 and similar 
confrontations between rival Sunni parties for power,51 are clear 
indicators that the struggle in Iraq is for power. Even the interaction 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
happen in non-totalitarian societies.‖  And: Woodward. 245 Iraqi Leaders are advancing 
Sectarian Agendas.‖ & 246 Former Secretary Condoleezza Rice‘s questioning ―if they 
themselves are undermining population security through sectarianism how in the world 
are we going to use American forces to do it?‖ & ―the intelligence indicated that the 
Maliki government still showed signs of backing a sectarian agenda.‖ 
 
49 Duss and Juul. 1 ―the ongoing competition among rival Shia factions—manifested in 
a series of political and military confrontations in the wake of the U.S. overthrow of 
Saddam Hussein.‖  2  ―How the points of contention among Iraq‘s Shia parties, which 
mirror the divisions within Iraq‘s broader Shia Arab community, are resolved at the 
ballot box and in the streets of the country by their respective militias.‖  & 2 ―… three 
dominant and fiercely independent Shia political organizations—the Da‘wa Party, the 
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, or ISCI, and the Sadrists, along with the smaller but 
still significant Fadhila—will attempt through the ballot box and armed conflict to 
secure a majority of Shia votes in Iraq in order to lead the country‘s Shia-majority 
provinces.  And:  Abdul-Ahad. Three officers from the Iraqi National Intelligence Service 
(INSI) stated that: "Maliki and the leadership of Dawa [Maliki's party] managed to obtain 
the loyalty of military and civilian institutions and commanders and now those officers 
are loyal to Dawa and moved their alliances from other parties. 
 
50 "Bloodshed in Iraq, Intra-Shia Violence Amid Other Underlines", The Economist 
http://www.economist.com/daily/news/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10925638 (accessed 
11/11/ 2008).  And: Philip Zelikow, "The New Strategic Situation in Iraq", Foreign Policy 
http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/02/09/the_new_strategic_situation_in_ir
aq (accessed 02/25/ 2009). ―The United Iraqi Alliance bloc is disintegrating (the largest 
bloc in parliament that is purely Shiite).‖  And: III and others, The Iraq Study Group 
Report. 16 ―fissures have emerged within the broad Shiite coalition, known as the 
United Iraqi Alliance. Shiite factions are struggling for power—over regions, ministries, 
and Iraq as a whole. The difficulties in holding together a broad and fractious coalition 
have led several observers in Baghdad to comment that Shiite leaders are held ―hostage 
to extremes.‖ Within the coalition as a whole, there is a reluctance to reach a political 
accommodation with the Sunnis or to disarm Shiite militias.‖  And: III, My Year in Iraq: 
The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 148 , 195, 196, 198, 330, 368, & 369.  And: 
Alissa J. Rubin, "Shiite Rivalries Slash at a Once Calm Iraqi City," The New York Times, 
06/21/ 2007. 
 
51 Karen DeYoung, "Experts Doubt Drop in Violence in Iraq, Military Statistics Called 
into Question," The Washington Post, 09/06/ 2007.  And: Zelikow,   (accessed). ―Sunni 
parties ... Are fractured.‖  And:  Fadhel Al-Badrani, "Iraq Tribes Threaten to Take up 
Arms over Poll," Reuters, 02/02/ 2009.  And:  Mohammed Abbas, "Iraq Sunni Anti-
Qaeda Leader Eyes Shi'ite Alliance," Reuters, 04/12/ 2009. ―A senior leader in a Sunni 
Arab movement founded to combat al Qaeda in Iraq is edging away from the military 
activity of the past, toward a once unthinkable alliance with the country's Shi'ite prime 
minister.‖ 
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between the Kurdish parties ―each vying to outdo the other‖52 proves the 
point.53    
Consequently, redesigning the electoral process will facilitate 
shifting the locus of power54 and allow Iraqi politics to shift from the 
power games of the elites—molded as identity-based politics and leading 
to ―descriptive representation‖55—to ―substantive representation.‖56   
Building on the premise that ―formal electoral rules are not neutral 
in their impact; instead, they systematically benefit some while 
penalizing others,‖57 ―the hope in proposing a structural change is to 
                                                             
52 III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 386.  Also see: Scott 
Carpenter and Michael Rubin, "Kurdistan's Troubled Democracy," The Washington Post, 
04/18/ 2009.  And:  "Iraq Kurdish Force 'Beyond Law'," BBC, 04/14/ 2009. 
 
53 III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope.   96 ―on July 10, 2003 the 
two Kurdish parties informed us that they had been unable to agree between them on 
any additional female member,‖ 124 ―the Two Kurdish leaders … had been unable to 
agree which of them should take the Kurdish seat.  So they demanded that each of 
them be seated in the Councils Presidency,‖ 149 ―the Kurds divvied up their five cabinet 
positions between the two main Kurdish parties.‖ Furthermore, The Kurdish 
Democratic Party (KDP), and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), fought bitterly over 
the control of the Kurdish region after gaining de facto autonomy following Iraq‘s defeat 
in the first Gulf War.  And, they continued to run completely separate and disconnected 
areas of influence in the northern Kurdish region, with two governments and territories, 
until after 2003.  This occurred despite the fact that both are Kurdish nationalist 
parties, and Sunni Muslims.  Also see: "Amnesty International Warns of Rights Abuses 
in Iraqi Kurdistan," Washington TV, 04/14/ 2009. 
 
54 March and Olsen.  744  ―internal institutional processes affect things like the power 
distribution, the distribution of preferences, or the management of control.‖ 
 
55 Stone. 359 ―representatives who share important demographic characteristics with 
their constituents.‖ 
 
56 Ibid. 359 ―representatives who share important policy beliefs and goals with their 
constituents.‖ 
 
57 Norris. 9.  Also see: Donald L. Horowitz, "Electoral Systems: A Primer for Decision 
Makers," Journal of Democracy 14, no. 4 (October 2003). 116 ―The fact that each 
electoral system contains a different array of biases from every other electoral system 
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split up old or potential alliances, establish new ones, and so place a 
favored interest in a position of dominance.‖58 Finally, this study‘s 
recommendations are devised in such a way to filter the Iraqi elites and 
promote moderates.59   
Moderates share the perspective of a free democratic Iraq; 
therefore, shifting power in their favor will make attaining the strategic 
objectives stated above, feasible, and enduring.60 Note that such a 
proposal is closely aligned with the objective of the military surge to ―buy 
time … so that a moderate coalition can emerge.‖61 
  The United States can play a crucial role in advancing such a 
structural change.  The US remains an important stake holder in Iraq.62  
Most of the key actors in Iraq are still vulnerable vis-à-vis each other.63  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
means that those who decide among such systems can choose, in effect, to prefer one 
set of biases over another.‖ 
 
58 Stone.  375. 
 
59 Roland Paris, "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism," International 
Security 22, no. 2 (1997).  58 ―designing electoral arrangements that reward moderation 
rather than extremism‖  and:  Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, "Political 
Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," Political Studies 44 (1996).  939 ―what do 
institutions do? … they provide moral or cognitive templates for interpretation and 
action … provide filters for interpretation … institutions affect the very identities, self-
image, and preferences of actors.‖ & 941 ―institutions distribute power unevenly across 
social groups or interests.‖  
 
60 "Iraqi P.M. Calls for Strong Central Government," AFP, 01/29/ 2009. 
 
61 Woodward. 275. 
 
62 Zelikow,   (accessed). ―The U.S. military presence remains a large, vital, reality in 
Iraq.‖ 
 
63 Ibid.  (accessed). ―there are growing dangers of civil conflict in northern Iraq … the 
United States could find itself caught in the middle between Kurdish friends, local 
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This alignment will allow the US to play a pivotal role—possibly even 
serve as a ―trigger‖64—to induce this change, if it is to adopt such a 
structural re-modification as an essential part of its ―political surge.‖65  
The US can exert external pressures, provide inducements to alter the 
political calculus, and promote the advocated change.66   
The US intervention in this matter will help tilt the balance and 
mitigate the extreme asymmetries of power among those who genuinely 
share America‘s vision of the new Iraq, and extremists in power.67  These 
extremists benefit from the current formula; moderates, on the other 
hand, are left much too weak.  Thus, they cannot possibly induce a 
change.68 Therefore, external interference is crucial for such an 
institutional change.  If and when such a change materializes, Iraq will 
then be on the right path, as this study will show.69   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Sunni nationalists, and a central government in Baghdad that might be tempted to win 
Sunni friends by "dealing" forcefully with the Kurds. The Kurds might be a tempting 
scapegoat for a government that wants to highlight itself as an Arab national unifier … 
 And the decline in oil prices will constrain the national government's largess.‖ 
 
64 Pierson. 141. 
 
65 Stone.  274 ―incentives work by capitalizing on the weaknesses of the targets, not by 
empowering them.‖ & 305 persuasion possibly even through inducing fear                  
Also see:  "Remarks of President Barack Obama – Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq 
(Camp Lejeune, North Carolina)",   (accessed).  
 
66 Stone. 266 &267   and:  Hall and Taylor.  939. 
 
67 Hall and Taylor.  938. 
 
68 Pierson.  143  also see: 142 ―‗institutional resilience.‘ Can be accounted as factors to 
sustain the institutional change.‖  Also see: Stone. 269 ―no fear of attenuation.‖   
 
69 Hoagland. 
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Chapter II:  
The Political and Electoral System in Post Saddam’s Iraq— Flawed And 
Malfunctioning 
The strategic objective of OIF suffered a fatal blow because of the 
way the political process was operationalized in Iraq. Even before the 
onset of OIF, the Americans relied on a group of Iraqis in exile70 for 
information on how to shape post-Saddam Iraq.71  The Iraqi political and 
electoral systems were devised by the Coalition Provincial Authority, after 
consultations with the UN.72   
The Iraqi political system is parliamentarian. It follows the concept 
of infusion of powers. The parliament consists of 275 representatives.73 
The electoral system established after 2003 is a closed party list74 
                                                             
70 III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope.  48, 55, 58, 59, 83, 92, 93, 
Bad advice from Iraqi exiles  of whom many showed no reservation to project their 
biased approach, or even outright dismay with the Concept of Iraq as a country.  As 
such, 27, 38, 54, 59, 81, 93, 94 Paul Bremer came to Iraq with a sectarian mind set.  
224 and continued to build on that mind set by taking advice from such sectarian and 
ethnically biased figures as he states in deriving his conclusions ―all my conversation 
with Kurdish and Shiite Leaders.‖  And: Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military 
Adventure in Iraq (New York: The Penguin Press, 2006).  391 ―Bremer took bad advice.‖ 
 
71 Gordon and Trainor. 582&583 (Subject: Iraq: Political consultations, 19 June, point 
#4 and 8).  And:  III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 26. 
 
72 Pierson. 104 the CPA and UN ―determined the choice of the formal institutions in 
Iraq.‖  And: III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 218, see also: 
230, 240, 328, 348, 356, & 367. 
 
73 Iraq Electoral Fact Sheet, (United Nations Electoral Assistance Division). 5 & 6. 
 
74 Ibid. 6.  
19 
 
proportional representation,75 and Iraq as a whole is a single electoral 
district.76 People merely vote for closed and broad coalition lists 
consisting of 275 candidates to elect representatives to the legislative.77  
These representatives elect a president and, the President in turn 
                                                             
75 Ibid. 5, 7 & 8 ―Inclusive: The main purpose for the national assembly in the transition 
is to form a constituent assembly. The legitimacy of the constitution will depend heavily 
on broad inclusiveness and representation of interests amongst the national assembly. 
The PR system is most effective in gaining inclusive representation for a range of 
groups, rather than a ―winner take-all‖ system (plurality-majority systems), where large 
groups can secure an overwhelming majority. Simple and transparent: The PR system 
allows a voter to cast one vote, which simplifies the voting process to include lowering 
the voter education requirements – and creates a more transparent system. The 
simplicity of the system also makes it more operationally feasible to implement. No 
census data required: The system can be implemented on a single national district 
without census data and a lengthy and controversial exercise to determine sub-national 
electoral districts. In so doing, it also minimizes difficulties and controversies of 
population movement within the country (e.g. Kirkuk). Best for women and minorities: 
The system accommodates the goal for achieving women‘s representation and fair 
representation of minorities, as they will be able to vote collectively from around the 
country for the same list or candidate. (If the elections were conducted in sub-national 
districts, their votes would be restricted to localized parties or large national groups 
with the resources to compete around the country.) Encourages alliances and moderate 
positions: The system encourages political groups to form alliances around the country 
and appeal to as many constituencies as possible. Similarly, this need to appeal to 
differing constituencies tends to moderate a group‘s position. At the same time, the PR 
system also allows independent candidates to be elected, without forcing them to join 
political parties. Permits local representation: By not requiring national 
coverage/presence and permitting partial lists (of as few as 12 candidates), as well as 
independent candidates – the system permits a basis for localized representation to 
emerge. Least vulnerable to security problems: The national district permits candidates 
to campaign with less disruption caused by localized violence or insecurity. By being 
placed on a national ballot, the effectiveness of targeted political violence against 
candidates is minimized. Similarly, lists of candidates reduce the ability to individually 
target and intimidate. Most accommodating to out-of-country voting:  The system 
accommodates a practical response to out-of-country voting. A national district permits 
out-of-country voters to participate in the process, as their vote does not have to be 
counted towards a sub-national location, which can be highly controversial. The IECI 
has decided to pursue a limited (will occur in several countries) out-of-country 
operation that is estimated to cost about US$90 million. (The countries in which out-of-
country voting may occur have not been determined at this time.)‖ 
 
76 Ibid. 6. 
 
77 Norris. 51 in closed lists ―voter can only select which party to support, and each party 
decides the ranking of their candidates on the list.  The rank order of candidates on the 
party list determines who is elected to parliament.‖ 
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nominates a Prime Minister from the majority bloc in parliament.78  The 
Prime Minister (PM) must be voted in by the parliament,79 and is the 
chief executive in Iraq.80 The PM is also the Commander in Chief of the 
armed forces.81   
The rationale behind choosing such a system was that proportional 
representations are easy to design and implement.82  The idea was that 
the designed system is ―inclusive‖ and ―represents a broad and diverse 
cross-section of the Iraqi society.‖83  However, these designers left out a 
consequential question, the inclusion of whom?  The consequences of 
overlooking such a question were and are devastating, as this study will 
demonstrate.84  
The previous regime in Iraq was dictatorial and governed through a 
single party85 for three and a half decades.86 This diminished the 
                                                             
78 Country Profile: Iraq, (Washington DC: Federal Research Division, 2006). 16. 
 
79 Ibid. 17. 
 
80 Ibid. 16  and: III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 373. 
 
81 Country Profile: Iraq. 16. 
 
82 Iraq Electoral Fact Sheet.  6. 
 
83 Ibid.  5. 
 
84 Horowitz.  115  ―To evaluate an electoral system or to choose a new one, it is 
necessary to ask first what one wants the electoral system to do. No electoral system 
simply reflects voter preferences or the existing pattern of cleavages in a society or the 
prevailing political party configuration. Every electoral system shapes and reshapes 
these features of the environment, and each does so in different ways.‖  Also see for the 
interactions among electoral rules and elites: Richard Gunther, "Electoral Laws, Party 
Systems, and Elites: The Case of Spain," The American Political Science Review 83, no. 3 
(1989). 835 & 853. 
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prospects for the emergence of civil society.  Hundreds of thousands if 
not millions of Iraqi citizens were victims of massacres.  Iraqis lived 
under the oppression and tyranny of a handful of loyalists faithful to 
Saddam under a single party system.87  This took a very heavy toll on the 
Iraqi social fabric;88 emotions were high, and wounds were fresh.  
Saddam Hussein, the head of this tyrannical regime governed with an 
iron fist.  This eliminated the chances for political parties to form and 
evolve.  There were no organized political parties, with the exception of a 
few mainly extremist parties ―offering nondemocratic ideologies … 
representing ethnic or religious positions … and, parties based on a 
proposal to break up the existing nation-state.‖89 These parties were 
formed and vetted in other countries in the region, and lived in exile.90 
Iraq as a nation was dismantled after the fall of Baghdad.  The 
government collapsed, and there was no replacement; the Iraqi Security 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
85 Jennifer Gandhi, Political Institutions under Dictatorship (Cambridge University Press, 
2008). 152. 
 
86 III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 30 &  79. 
 
87 Ibid. 35. 
 
88 Ibid. 379. 
 
89 Jr. G. Bingham Powell, "Party Systems and Political System Performance: Voting 
Participation, Government Stability and Mass Violence in Contemporary Democracies," 
The American Political Science Review 75, no. 4 (1981). P862& P865 
 
90 Gordon and Trainor. 470. 
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Forces were dissolved, and the infrastructure and institutions were 
looted and burned.91  This dismantlement left a vacuum.92    
 Consequently, after the fall of Saddam‘s regime and transition 
from dictatorship, the institutional gap was filled by the previously 
mentioned extremist parties that had been in exile.93 The majority of 
these parties are formed around ethnic and sectarian lines; they held 
ideologies that negated all that the American objective stood for and had 
regional ties that ran against the US‘s vision for the future of Iraq and 
the region.94  
The designed political system in Iraq yielded unanticipated 
consequences.95  The political and electoral systems employed in Iraq 
alienated the constituency,96 empowered radical and extremist political 
parties and elites, and excluded moderates.97   
                                                             
91 III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 37. 
 
92 Ibid. 27, & 31. 
 
93 Sisk. 5 ―Civil society is weak and populations are traumatized by the effects of war: 
weak civil society and affected populations are less able to stand up to political forces 
led by extremists or ideologues‖  and:  III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future 
of Hope. 49. 
 
94 Gordon and Trainor. 470. 
 
95 Pierson. 104. 
 
96 Stone.  298 ―in proportional representation a legislator‘s electoral fortune depends far 
more on that of his own political party and less on pleasing voters with tangible and 
symbolic rewards.‖ 
 
97 Ayad Allawi, "How Iraq‘s Elections Set Back Democracy," The New York Times, 
11/02/ 2007. ―gave rise to our sectarian Parliament, controlled by party leaders rather 
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Basically, the implemented system has totally backfired.  To 
illustrate the connection between the structure of the devised political 
system in Iraq and the unraveling of events, the following paragraph 
reveals similar results of employing the same kind of system in another 
country.  For in fact, the emplaced system in Iraq is a replica of the 
electoral system in Israel, and has yielded an exacerbated form of the 
complications from which Israel is suffering:98  
The choice and composition of the government were 
practically out of the hands of the voters. 
Popular disaffection with the established parties rose, 
and the overall perception of democracy was being 
tarnished. 
Electoral deadlock was no longer an exception, but the 
norm. 
New and splinter parties were encouraged to form, 
thereby constantly increasing the fragmentation and 
polarization of the party system … 
Multiparty governments made the process of decision 
making difficult, with veto power granted to most 
parties in the coalition on a variety of issues. 
Cabinet crises occurred frequently, immobilizing the 
government for long periods of time. 
The overall result was not only a non-working 
parliamentary format, but a dangerous crisis of 
democratic authority. 99 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
than by the genuine representatives of the people. They have assembled a government 
unaccountable and unanswerable to its people.‖ 
 
98 Reuven Y. Hazan, "Presidential Parliamentarism Direct Popular Election of the Prime 
Minister, Israel‘s New Electoral and Political System," Electoral Studies 15, no. 1 (1996). 
23 ―The Israeli polity entered a crisis period … during which the two major parties tried 
to outbid each other with ever-increasing offers in order to 'purchase' the political 
support of the religious parties.‖ 
 
99 Ibid.  27. 
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Similar repercussions in Iraq from instituting the same, of the 
political system of Israel, are due to the failure to measure how the 
designed political and electoral system relates to the following attributes 
of the Iraqi context:100 
First, proportional systems require unity,101 a requirement that the 
political parties in Iraq can not satisfy. If this requirement is absent, then 
proportional systems: (a) will produce coalition governments that are 
fragmented, weak, and, unstable;102 and (b) will enable extremist parties 
to gain power, and produce legislative fractionalization.103 As such, 
proportional representation has ―reinforced, rather than ameliorated … 
cleavages.‖104 
At best, proportional systems in post-war state-building hinder 
democratic development and progress,105 and, may ―stimulate a loss of 
                                                             
100 Allawi. 
 
101 Andre Blais, "The Debate over Electoral Systems," International Political Science 
Review 12, no. 3 (1991).  243.  Also: to further clarify what this study means by unity: 
proportional representation without the presence of an honored pact among the elites, 
or lack of ―adjustment,‖ or the lack of common vision on basic yet characteristically 
defining issues, would lead to disunity. For definition of pact see: Guillermo O'Donnell 
and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions 
About Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University 
Press: The Woodrow Wilson International Center  For Scholars, 1986). 37. 
 
102 Ibid. 242. 
 
103 G. Bingham Powell. 874. 
 
104 Norris. 65. 
 
105 Sisk. 20. 
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confidence in representative democracy.‖106  In the worst case scenario, 
this system is a threat to the democratic regime,107 will diminish the 
prospects of democracy to survive,108 and will lead to a ―breakdown of 
democracy.‖109 
―The median country has about 9 percent of the vote going to 
extremist parties in the average election … 15 percent as a mark of 
extremist support of a serious nature, a figure that seems roughly to 
correspond to the point at which observers of the country begin to 
express concern.‖110  In Iraq the level of elected parties that fall within 
the scope of extremism as defined above are close to 90%.111 If 15% 
extremists should generate serious concern, then, the 90% must set off 
alarms that necessitate revising the entire system.  
Fragmentations within the government are maximized because of 
the political system in Iraq that promotes extremism and incorporates 
extremist parties in the government.112  Therefore, instead of settling the 
                                                             
106 Blais. 242. 
 
107 Ibid. 255. 
 
108 G. Bingham Powell. 861. 
 
109 Blais. 242. 
 
110 G. Bingham Powell.  865.  
 
111 Galbraith. 3 & 89. 
 
112 Yacoub. ―Iraq's Prime Minister said sectarianism is a ‗rotten thing‘ and … blamed 
sectarianism for destroying the country.‖ 
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accounts and differences through the electoral process;113 the diversity of 
interests and approaches are all brought into the government.114   
The end result in Iraq today is a natural outcome of this system.115  
―The lethality of conflict in Iraq has reached horrendous proportions for 
civilians. … The US promotion of democracy in this country provides 
space for partisan electoral politics by ethnic and religious groups … and 
also, paradoxically, increases risks of terrorism.‖116 
Second, the implemented system totally alienated the Iraqi 
people,117 since the closed party list version of the proportional system 
gives the elites the ability to determine who gets elected in Iraq.118  The 
voter merely votes for coalition lists, and does not have a say in choosing 
candidates.119  So, the elites have the upper hand in forming the 
                                                             
113 Blais. 244. 
 
114 Ibid.  242 & 244. 
 
115 Hall and Taylor. 937 & 938 the structure of institutions molds politics.  And:    
Pierson. 165 ―North‘s definition of institutions ‗the rules of the game in a society or … 
the humanly devised constrains that shape human interaction.‖    
 
116 J. Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted Robert Gurr, Peace and Conflict 
(Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of 
Maryland, 2008).  9.    
 
117 Blais. 242 ―voters exercise less control over the government. It is more difficult to get 
rid of a coalition than of a one-party government.‖  
 
118 Sisk.  9 ―closed-list nature of the system gives political parties strong internal power 
over their own rank-and-file (through the control of candidacy selection) such that the 
top-level elites normally wield considerable power; closed-list PR systems are power-
centralizing.‖   And:  Norris. 51.  
 
119 Pippa Norris, "Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed 
Systems," International Political Science Review 18, no. 3 (1997). 303 ―voters can only 
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legislative branch, not the people.  Based on the principle of infusion of 
powers, those who control who get voted into parliament, also control the 
formation of the executive branch. Over and above, ideally, the PM 
nominates cabinet members who are approved by parliament.120   
However, the consensual part of the Iraqi political system—the concept of 
―National Unity‖ Government—gives the respective political entities the 
authority to nominate cabinet members.   
The chief executive must balance the varying interests of the 
political elites since s/he relies on these elites to gain power. On the 
other hand, neither the executive nor the legislative branches heed the 
people‘s needs since voters are not the source of their power. The 
dominant political entities and their party elites are the source of power 
in Iraq. Therefore, only these elites‘ interests and agendas are 
considered. 
The political process in Iraq became a hostage in the hands of 
elites.  The entire process lacks transparency and accountability—an 
important component of any democratic system.121  Moreover, the system 
is not flexible and is not prone to change.  The elites tightly control the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
select the party, and the ranking of candidates is determined by the political party. The 
rank order on the party list determines which candidates are elected.‖   
 
120 Country Profile: Iraq. 17. 
 
121 Stone.  360 ―the central test of representation is not whether representatives share 
demographic characteristics with constituents but whether they are accountable to 
their constituents.‖ 
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system,122 and the system does not allow for elite alterations.123  ―The 
outcome of each election is a foregone conclusion, leaving only the exact 
allocation of parliamentary seats to be decided.‖124  
  As such, a fundamental tenet of democracy—power vested in the 
citizens—is missing in Iraq;125 citizens are marginalized or totally 
excluded from the process.  Thus, people in Iraq living under miserable 
circumstances do not have an outlet for their grievances.126 This 
naturally produces tensions and promotes violence.   
―Many Iraqis feel that crime not only is unpunished, it is 
rewarded;‖127 ―Pessimism is pervasive;‖128 and this negative atmosphere 
                                                             
122 Allawi.  ―gave rise to our sectarian Parliament, controlled by party leaders rather 
than by the genuine representatives of the people. They have assembled a government 
unaccountable and unanswerable to its people.‖  and:    Pierson.  145 contrary to 
Pierson‘s assertion that political actors do not have property rights, parties unlike 
people have very long durability. 
 
123 Sisk.  20. 
 
124 Hazan. 
 
125 Charles Tilly, Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006 ). 10 
―‗polyarchal democracy‘ installs six distinctive institutions: elected officials; free, fair, 
and frequent elections; freedom of expression; alternative sources of information; 
associational autonomy; and inclusive citizenship … criteria for polyarchal democracy 
describe a working process, a series of regularized interactions among citizens and 
officials. These go far beyond the usual procedural standards … if a regime operates all 
six institutions, it counts as a democracy. If it lacks any of them, or some of them aren't 
really working, it doesn't count as a democracy,‖ 11 & 12 ―full-fledged citizenship, 
which plays a crucial part in democracy.‖ 
 
126 Stone.  360  ―citizens who have no influence over ‗their‘ representatives and no way 
to kick them out of office if they do not effectively represent the citizens‘ policy views.‖  
& 336 an unrighteous system since ―to bring grievances is absolutely essential to the 
function of a rights system.‖ 
 
127 III and others, The Iraq Study Group Report. 8. 
 
128 Ibid. 9. 
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hampers the rule of law, thus forcing Iraqis to join one side or another 
out of no choice but to survive. 
What makes the situation in Iraq even worse is the nature of the 
empowered elites in Iraq.129 Noting that the role of elites and the 
distribution of capabilities among these elites determine the course—
success or failure—of transitions from dictatorship: 
The centrality of political elites in establishing 
and terminating democracy, and deficits in rule of law 
and state capacity as the primary challenge to the 
quality and survival of new democracies … ranging 
from … the origins and design of democracy to its 
overall quality and sustainability …  There is also 
widespread agreement that political elites play a central 
role in democratization … In particular, whether there 
is a transition from dictatorship to democracy seems to 
depend heavily on the interests, values, and actions of 
political leaders … If political leaders, for various 
reasons, are understood to be the founders of 
democracy, then they also often function, after that 
initial breakthrough, as its sustainers or its 
underminers … Political elites design political 
institutions (which affect the quality and, perhaps, the 
very survival of democracy).130  
The key question for regime paths is the 
distribution of liberal and illiberal political groupings 
between these two categories and the resources that 
mobilized versus demobilized groups command.131 
                                                             
129 III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 83, 85, 86, 87, 100, 122, 
& 123 ―the rotating presidency also hindered the GC‘s effectiveness.  It had seemed a 
necessary compromise when the Council was formed in July.  Members found that they 
could not agree on any one leader and instead, through a tortuous line of reasoning –
emblematic of the sectarian divides within the body, and Iraq itself—wound up selecting 
a nine-man rotating presidency.‖ 
 
130 Valerie Bunce, "Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations," 
Comparative Political Studies  (2000;).   703, 707, & 709. 
 
131 Ibid. 713. 
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The extremist parties that have risen to power in Iraq have a dually 
devastating effect.  These parties and their elites are identity oriented.132  
They capitalize on their sectarian and/or ethnic affiliations in a top down 
manner to maintain their power.133  As such, the elites in Iraq use all the 
resources available—their financial resources, militias,134 the educational 
                                                             
132 Suzanne Mettler and Joe Soss, "The Consequences of Public Policy for Democratic 
Citizenship: Bridging Policy Studies and Mass Politics," Perspectives on Politics 2, no. 1 
(Mar., 2004). 59 ―Institutions that cultivate values and beliefs; the vitality and 
alignment of organizations that transform diffuse groups into coherent political 
collectives-e.g., parties, unions; political actors' targeted mobilization and 
demobilization efforts; political opportunity structures related to elite cleavages, 
propensity for repression, et cetera; and state actions that distribute resources to 
political groups.‖ And: III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 49 
―this ethnically, spiritually, and politically disparate group was not accustomed to 
cooperation.‖ 
 
133 Sisk. 5 ―Post-war environments may be vulnerable to the emergence of wily elites 
who will mobilize on divisive nationalist, ethnic, or racial themes in their quest for 
power.‖  And: III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 218 ―Sunni 
Baathists fighting Shiite, and Kurdish Militias, and Iraq fragmenting along sectarian 
and geographical fault lines.‖  Also see for the role of the elites in transition and 
consolidation of democracy: Leonardo  Morlino and José Ramón Montero, "Legitimacy 
and Democracy in Southern Europe," in The Politics of Democratic Consolidation. 
Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective, ed. Richard P. Gunther, P. Nikiforos 
Diamandouros, and Hans-Jürgen Puhle (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1995 ). 258. And: Mariano Torcal, "The Origins of Democratic Support in Post-
Franco: Spain: Learning to Be a Democrat under Authoritarian Rule?," in Spain 
Transformed.  The Late Franco Dictatorship, ed. Nigel Towson (Houndmills: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007). 198 ―democratic support and non-democratic regime rejection mostly 
reflects an attitudinal change springing from the essentially individual political 
experience of the transition to, and consolidation of, the new democracy; a change in 
which the most important political and social actors and elites play a leading role. The 
absence, or failure, of an attempt to politicize the issue of the approval of the preceding 
regime and/or the new one by significant political actors is the main explanation for the 
existence of this attitudinal change.‖  Also see: Gandhi. And: Guillermo O'Donnell and 
Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About 
Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press: The 
Woodrow Wilson International Center  For Scholars, 1986). And: Larry Diamond, 
Developing Democracy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999). 163 
―Elites (politicians, intellectuals, business and associational leaders, media 
practitioners, and so on) typically have distinctive values and norms (and invariably, 
more information about the system), and they often lead the way in large-scale value 
change.‖ 
 
134 Anthony J. Schwarz, Iraq’s Militias: The True Threat to Coalition Success in Iraq 
(Carlisle: US Army War Colledge, 2007).  57, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, 66 ―The militias were 
also used to coerce and threaten potential voters. For an example of a militia 
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system, their position in a government that they tightly control—to 
promote their identity-based approach.135  Hence, the elites in Iraq ―have 
blocked, derailed, or corrupted the electoral process in attempts to retain 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
commander using muscle to advance his political agenda one need look no further than 
the nomination of Ibrahim Jafari as Prime Minister of Iraq in February 2006. Jafari 
served as Prime Minister of the Iraqi Transitional Government during the year prior to 
February‘s nomination. The fact that he was broadly ineffective in advancing 
government programs and promoting national growth did not stop him from gaining the 
initial 2006 nomination. Jafari had the support of Sadr, whose militia threatened to 
harm many voting members if Jafari was not nominated in 2006 … Militias in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have undermined the political process repeatedly. Although some Iraqi 
militias and their affiliated political parties support a broad based disarmament 
initiative in principle, they are reluctant to proceed because of political rivalries, 
insurgent attacks, ethnic or sectarian violence, and lack of faith in the ability of 
national security forces. … militias do not support state institutions. Loyalties lie within 
the militia organization only. Even worse, militia members often pervade state security 
mechanisms in order to further the militia‘s agenda. Rather than providing security for 
a national populace, they have little regard for non-militia members. Militias influence 
the Iraqi security forces at all levels, making legitimate national security force units 
unable or unwilling to confront them … When they infiltrate government security forces, 
as they have in Afghanistan and as has been alleged in Iraq (including the reported Shia 
militia death squads comprised of forces within the Iraqi government‘s Ministry of 
Interior), militia activity is even more detrimental to security … Certain Iraqi leaders 
continue to see the need to utilize militias as an interim solution to quell violence until 
national security forces are able to provide decisive security. Some experts believe that 
Iraq‘s national party leaders do not have strong beliefs in the long-term political 
process, and for this reason, will not push to disband groups they view as effective at 
filling immediate security voids. … This original CPA attempt at outlawing militias 
lacked political will on the part of Iraqi lawmakers … After the Iraqis assumed full 
control of government, a primary security ministry, the Ministry of Interior, was allowed 
to fall into the hands of the Badr Corps. Though this private army has since renounced 
its militia title and now operates under the auspices of a civic group called the Badr 
Organization, common perception was that Bayan Jabr, former Badr Corps leader and 
Minister of Interior in 2005, was allowing Badr Corps ideology—if not its leaders 
directly—to play a strong role in directing the actions of Iraqi police. Many Shia militia 
members have been allowed to place members into army and police units as a way to 
serve political interests and gain influence for associated lawmakers. This phenomenon 
is especially evident in the Shia dominated south, where militia members have hindered 
the implementation of objective law enforcement. Political will is the single most 
important aspect of a successful DDR plan targeting militias. … Without a strong and 
clear message from the national government, militia activity will continue …  The fact 
that many militias in Iraq possess political power is significant.‖  And: Biddle, O'Hanlon, 
and Pollack. 39. 
 
135 Mettler and Soss.  58 ―"group-centrism" in mass opinion does not flow directly from 
some underlying element of individual or group psychology. Rather, it "depends 
importantly on the political context .... The framing of issues-by partisan elites and 
mass media organizations shapes public understanding of the roots of contemporary 
problems and merits of alternative solutions.‖ 
32 
 
power,‖136 and, prevent elite alteration.  The result is constant injection 
of sectarianism and ethnocentrism in the Iraqi society.137    
These elites are not only mistrustful of each other and do not 
compete for power within the democratic system, they also maintain 
active military wings that are responsible for much of the violence in 
Iraq,138 directly or indirectly.139 The maintenance of military wings and 
the contestation over power within the realms of government is affecting 
Iraq‘s statehood.140  This must be understood before even addressing the 
issue of democracy.141  The interactions of these elites and the resulting 
power politics deny the Iraqi state a monopoly over coercive means, and 
also deny recognition that the state is the supreme authority and 
arbitrator.142 The process also precludes unity of action in the conduct of 
                                                             
136 Norris, Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior. 4. 
 
137 "Review: Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity." 857 ―considerable 
evidence suggesting that political elites use violence to construct antagonistic ethnic 
identities, which in turn favor more violence.‖     And    Stone.:  307 indoctrination 
through religious propaganda ―designed to make its audience or subject serve someone 
else‘s interests … and rob people‘s capacity to think independently … it relies on 
appeals to fear, insecurity, or anxiety, it drives out rational thought.‖   And: Mettler and 
Soss. 61 ―policies convey messages about membership to individual citizens, they also 
influence patterns of group identity.‖ 
 
138 Woodward. 215, 216, and: III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 
274, 275.  And: "Executions Main Cause of Civilian Death During Iraq War," Associated 
Press 04/16/ 2009.  And:  "Iraq Kurdish Force 'Beyond Law'." 
 
139 Galbraith. 2 & 6.   
 
140 Max Fuller, "State-Sanctioned Paramilitary Terror in Basra under British 
Occupation", Center For Research on Globalization 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=9766 (accessed 04/02/ 
2009).  And: "Iraq Kurdish Force 'Beyond Law'."   
 
141 Linz and Stepan. 7, 17, 18, & 28. 
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foreign affairs,143 since each party lobbies for outside support to gain 
leverage in its internal struggle.  Thus, the actions of these elites are not 
only jeopardizing the prospects of democracy in Iraq, but are also 
endangering the Iraqi state itself. 
Moreover, such a fierce power dispute has made it virtually 
impossible to take vital steps necessary to stabilize Iraq—i.e., national 
reconciliation projects, demobilization, disintegration and reintegration 
(DDR), and, the rule of law—without constant external pressure from 
coalition countries.144  The political system in Iraq has become like 
entrenched warfare. 
Third, reducing Iraq to a single electoral district145 further 
facilitated the formation of the Iraqi political arena along sectarian and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
142 Tilly. 11 ―the features of states as ―organizations that control the major 
concentration of coercive means within a substantial territory, exercises priority in 
some regards over all other organizations operating within the same territory, and 
receive acknowledgment of that priority from other organizations, including states, 
outside the territory.‖ 
 
143 Joseph M. Grieco, "Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics," in 
New Thinking in International Relations Theory, ed. Michael Doyle and John Ikenberry.   
These elites have also hampered Iraq‘s ability to conduct foreign affairs as a state.  
These elites compete for support outside of Iraq also, while states are expected to 
―posses the capacity of unity of action.  This means that states have the capacity to act 
in coherent manner with regard to other countries.  Cohesive in turn means that 
central decision making maintain sufficient control over different organizational 
elements of their governments to allow them direct and coordinate government actions 
in such a way as to implement the decision making strategies, and to do so in a way 
that reflects their rank-ordering their goals.  Thus endowed with the capacity for 
coherent action in support of a centrally established and consistent hierarchy of goals.‖   
 
144 Allawi.  And: Gordon and Trainor. 476. 
 
145 III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 367. 
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ethnic lines.146 In Iraq, Kurds are concentrated in the north, Sunnis in 
the center and western parts of the country, and, Shiite in the south.  
Therefore, without having to compete in small districts—hence, against 
entities of the same sect and ethnicity—extremist parties were able to 
form political coalitions that are homogenous.147 This facilitates and 
rewards political entities for capitalizing on identities as credentials to 
win elections, and has so far punished those who refuse to invoke such 
credentials as means to win elections.  The result is that the three major 
blocs that account for the vast majority of votes, are characterized as 
Shiite, Sunni, and, Kurd.148 This situation was further exacerbated when 
the Iraqi state was dissolved, and people naturally returned to their sub-
identities, for protection.149 
                                                             
146 Mettler and Soss. 58 ―we must look beyond the individual to the communication 
flows citizens receive from political elites and mass media … common patterns of 
political thinking in mass publics can be viewed as politically constructed outcomes … 
In this view, partisan loyalties are more than socialized identities or instrumental 
allegiances; they are also, as Martin Shefter argues, political achievements constructed 
by innovative organizations that actively seek to attract mass followings.‖   And:  60 & 
61 ―Policies can alter preferences and perceptions of self-interest, shape basic beliefs 
about the nature of social reality, mobilize or pacify constituencies, and foment 
rebellion or serve to legitimate existing governmental and distributive arrangements … 
In some cases, public policies create, sustain, or deepen group divisions, even though 
the relevant groups may be defined on the basis of shared physical characteristics, 
cultural beliefs, or locales of residence. Indeed, policy designs not only can affect the 
ways a target group is viewed in the society at large; they also can influence how group 
members perceive and evaluate one another‖ 
 
147 Pierson. 114&115 long term institutional effects may be better treated as by-
products rather than goals of institutional designers … unanticipated consequences are 
of tremendous significance in modern polities.‖  And:  Galbraith. 6. 
 
148 Allawi. ―The vast majority of the electorate based their choices on sectarian and 
ethnic affiliations, not on genuine political platforms.‖ And: Galbraith. 3.  And: Sodaro.  
263. 
 
149 Galbraith. 8, 9, & 90. 
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Consequently, as mistrust and competitions characterized the 
relation among elites, accounts have come to be settled on the streets of 
Iraq through violence.150  Furthermore, to secure as much public support 
as possible to be leveraged in this power struggle,151 some entities have 
rallied people based on their sectarian identities,152 some based on their 
ethnic identities,153 and, others by promoting struggle against an 
occupier.154  This is a direct result of the system that does not force elites 
and political entities to secure cross-factional support to gain power.  
Hence, factional violence in Iraq is elite-led, and inflamed in a top-down 
approach.155   
                                                             
150 Mettler and Soss. 59 ―Likewise, group identification and consciousness do not 
simply emerge for individuals or social groups; they get organized into or out of the 
political process.  As Adam Przeworski explains, ‗If political parties do not mobilize 
people qua workers ... then workers are less likely to identify themselves as class 
members and, eventually, less likely to vote as workers.‘‖ 
 
151 "Review: Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity." 583 ―Strategic 
action by elites. What the pre-constructivist literature on ethnic conflict termed ‗elite 
theories of ethnic violence‘ provides promising grounds for a constructivist theory of 
ethnic violence in this sense… In these arguments, ethnic violence is explained as both 
a means and a by-product of political elites' efforts to hold or acquire power. Elites 
foment ethnic violence to build political support; this process has the effect of 
constructing more antagonistic identities, which favors more violence.‖ 
 
152 Ibid.  583. 
 
153 Ibid. 583. 
 
154 III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 287 Sherif Hussien Bin 
Ali‘s comment regarding the Sunni insurgency ―They do not oppose the coalition or the 
Americans, But they feel left out.‖ 
 
155 "Review: Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity."  583 ―the content 
and boundary rules of ethnic categories might be constructed by the actions of 
individuals seeking various ends. Consider, for example, the proposition that ethnic 
violence occurs when political elites construct antagonistic ethnic identities in order to 
strengthen their hold on power. In this approach, the insights of a "constructivist" 
approach merge with, or become hard to distinguish from, a rationalist or strategic 
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Fourth, on the government level, the consensual requirement and 
proportional representation brought these hardened identity-based elites 
together to share power and governance in Iraq.156  Iraq today retains an 
informal ―consociational‖ political system.157 This consociationalism in 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
choice approach.‖  And: Morlino and Montero. 258 ―divisive, opportunistic behavior of 
party elites, now of greater visibility (if not intrusiveness) in the television age.‖   
 
156 Pierson.  104 unanticipated consequences of the designed system by the CPA and 
the UN.  And: Woodward.  
 
157 Pippa Norris, Stable Democracy and Good Governance in Divided Societies: Do Power-
Sharing Institutions Work? (Harvard University, 2005). 3 &4 ―the thesis is that power-
sharing regimes encourage group cooperation (at best), and avoid outright ethnic 
rebellion (at worst), in plural societies divided into distinct linguistic, religious, 
nationalistic, and/or cultural communities … Consociationalism is designed to produce 
a stable political system due to elite cooperation despite social segmentation … four 
characteristics of ‗consociational‘ constitutions as an ideal-type: executive power-sharing 
among a ‗grand coalition‘ of political leaders drawn from all significant segments of 
society; a minority veto in government decision-making, requiring mutual agreement 
among all parties in the executive; proportional representation of major groups in elected 
and appointed office; and a high degree of cultural autonomy for groups … such regimes 
need is a democratic regime that emphasizes consensus instead of opposition, that 
includes rather than excludes, and that tries to maximize the size of the ruling majority …‘ 
The theory of consociationalism emphasizes the importance of governing incentives 
which work through a ‗top-down‘ two-stage process. First, power-sharing arrangements 
are thought to mitigate conflict among leadership elites. ‘Consociational democracy 
means government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented 
political culture into a stable democracy.’ These arrangements are designed to maximize 
the number of ‗stakeholders‘ who share an interest in playing by the rules of the game. 
This process is exemplified by proportional electoral systems with low vote thresholds 
which usually produce multiparty parliaments, with many minor parties each 
representing distinct segmented communities. In this context, party leaders have an 
incentive to bargain and collaborate with other factions in parliament in order to gain 
office in governing coalitions … all plural societies containing distinct ethnic 
communities divided by language, religion, and region, with constitutions characterized 
by multiple veto-points and extensive power-sharing.‖ And: Arend Lijphart, 
"Constitutional Design for Divided Societies," Journal of Democracy 15, no. 2 (April, 
2004).  96 & 97 ―the constitutional needs of countries with deep ethnic and other 
cleavages. In such deeply divided societies the interests and demands of communal 
groups can be accommodated only by the establishment of power sharing … deep 
societal divisions pose a grave problem for democracy, and that it is therefore generally 
more difficult to establish and maintain democratic government in divided than in 
homogeneous countries … the successful establishment of democratic government in 
divided societies requires two key elements: power sharing and group autonomy. Power 
sharing denotes the participation of representatives of all significant communal groups 
in political decision making, especially at the executive level; group autonomy means 
that these groups have authority to run their own internal affairs, especially in the 
areas of education and culture. These two characteristics are the primary attributes of 
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Iraq has hindered democratic consolidation.158 Furthermore, 
consociationalism in Iraq has created, reinforced, and ―frozen group 
boundaries,‖159 because it shaped institutions and provided incentives 
for actors competing for power to adopt identity politics.  Naturally, the 
result is political stalemate.160 Former CIA Director General Michael 
Hayden stated: 
The government is unable to govern … we have 
spent a lot of energy and treasure creating a 
government that is balanced, and it cannot function.  
The Inability of the government to govern seems 
irreversible. We have placed all our energies in creating 
a center, and the center cannot accomplish anything.161   
The Coalition Provincial Authority, after consulting the UN162 and 
capitalizing on ―constitutional experts‖ detached from the specificities of 
the Iraqi context,163 sought to address the prospects of power struggle in 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the kind of democratic system that is often referred to as power-sharing democracy or, 
to use a technical political-science term, ―consociational‖ democracy.‖  Also see: 
Kenneth N. Brown, Cutting the Grodian Knot:  Formation of a Consociational Government 
for Post Saddam Iraq (U.S. Army War College).  And: Sodaro. 188 & 189 
 
158 Norris, Stable Democracy and Good Governance in Divided Societies: Do Power-
Sharing Institutions Work? 2 ――Consociationalism‘ has always proved controversial.‖ 
 
159 Ibid. 2.  Furthermore: parties in Iraq applied the principle of consociation to their 
own ―homogenous‖ coalitions to overcome the zero-sum game that defines the relations 
among parties—even of those who have the same identity. 
 
160 Blais. 242 ―It is more difficult for the Cabinet to hold together as a unity when the 
government is a coalition‖  this is without mentioning that the coalitional is formed by 
political entities of hardened identities.  And:  Galbraith. 3.  Also see: Hazan.  23 
―without a consensus on national priorities, immobilism set in and the government 
became one of national paralysis.‖ 
 
161 Woodward. 217, 221 ―Hayden had been adamant about the Iraqi government‘s 
inability to govern,‖ & 222 Lee Hamilton‘s remarks. 
 
162 III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope.  78, 244, 279, & 281. 
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Iraq by laying the foundation for national unity government in Iraq 
through consensus.164   
The designers of the Iraqi political system overlooked the 
questions: Who will be included by devising such a system? And, 
National unity and consensus among whom? They introduced a system 
of sectarian and ethnic quotas in Iraq165 instead of a national unity 
government built on consensus.  The effects of establishing sectarian and 
ethnic quotas was that it brought about a gathering mainly of 
fundamental ethnic and sectarian groups in a so-called representative 
governing system.166  This system was emplaced in spite of Bremer‘s 
recognition that such a system ―can lead to paralysis.‖167  
This sectarian and ethnic quota system with its consensus focus 
became the basis upon which the Iraqi political process was built.168 It is 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
163 Pierson. 112  ―‘constitutional experts‘ or ‗provisions merchants‘ ‗called in to help 
design systems in lands from homes,‘ … ‗simply bring along their usual tool kits‘ … in 
short particular arrangements may well be adopted because they are perceived to be 
appropriate.‖ 
 
164 Galbraith. 3. 
 
165 Pierson. 104 unanticipated consequences of the system devised in Iraq.  And: Mettler 
and Soss.  58  ―Whoever decides what the game is about decides also who gets into the 
game.‖   And:  Jamal,   (accessed). And:   III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a 
Future of Hope.  Paul Bremer knew that this system could favor extremists 87, 89, 93, 
218, 226 ―elections … could favor the best organized political parties, including 
Islamists,‖ & 242. 
 
166 Hall and Taylor. 941 ―how institutions create paths.‖   
 
167 III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope.  213. 
 
168 Iraq Electoral Fact Sheet.   And:  Pierson. 120 & 121 even if the institutions will 
outlive the actors, in such a system of heavy reliance on political entities the adverse 
effects will endure, since, parties unlike people have a much longer life. 
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imperative to note the importance of timing and the sequencing of 
events.  These factors played ―a critical role‖ since the ―early parts of a 
sequence matter much more than later parts,‖169 and the ―final 
destination depends on the path.‖170  Thus, the head start given to such 
elites and political entities, and the designed system and sequence of 
events—along with the speed with which they were rushed in,171—
account for many of the problems in Iraq since the regime change.172   
The consequences are that the UN and the CPA brought in a group 
of exiles, mainly of rigid religious and ethnic identities,173 and provided 
them with all the resources and power that government can provide to 
pursue their struggle for power.174   
                                                             
169 Pierson. 44. 
 
170 Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern 
Europe and Latin America. 51. 
 
171 III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 225 & 293.  And:  Sodaro.  
267. 
 
172 Pierson. 13, 18, 19, 31, 39, 44, 45, 55, 56, 60 ―tremendous power rests in those who 
select the sequence design the system gained,‖ & 71 ―initiating a process.‖ 
 
173 March and Olsen. 744 ―symbolic behavior is also a strategic element in political 
competition. Individuals and groups are frequently hypocritical, reciting sacred myths 
without believing them and while violating their implications.  In particular, a serious 
theoretical understanding of myths, symbols, and rituals must include some attention 
to the dynamics of symbols, to the processes by which symbols shape the behavior not 
only of the innocent but of the society as a whole.‖ 
 
174 Conducting a Conflict Assessment - a Framework for Strategy and Program 
Development, (Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)- 
Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, 2005).  22 ―While certain groups may 
have an incentive for violence, the question remains as to whether they have the means 
to do so. Do these groups have the organizational capacity necessary to sustain 
violence? Do they have access to money and weapons, and on what scale? Do they have 
international backers? Are there pools of recruits they can draw on? Without these 
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The above-stated and unanticipated consequences of the system 
designed by the CPA and the UN created ―path dependence,‖175 and 
―positive feedbacks‖176 for the emerging political elites.  In a nutshell, 
these elites saw their interests being served by such a system.   Hence, a 
loop of ―self reinforcing‖ 177 mechanisms lead these elites to preserve this 
system that serves well their entrenched interests.178 Embarking on such 
an opportunity,179 these elites and political entities naturally codified 
their interests, factionalism, and fragmentation, in the constitution180 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
resources, no matter how deeply felt a grievance or overwhelming the desire for 
economic or political gain, incentives for violence cannot find expression. The second 
major category therefore focuses on whether people with incentives for violence have 
access to the resources they need to turn that incentive into sustained violence.‖ 
 
175 Pierson. 11 ―path dependence exemplify ‗historical causation‘ in which dynamics 
triggered by an event or process at one point in time reproduce themselves even in the 
absence of the recurrence of the original event or process.‖  & 13 ―the significance of the 
beginning‖  &18. 
 
176 Mettler and Soss.  60 ―‗policy feedback‘ refers to the ways ‗policies, once enacted, 
restructure subsequent political processes.‘ … two kinds of feedback effects: new 
policies may transform state capacities by creating, building upon, or undercutting 
administrative arrangements; and they may affect the identities, political goals, and 
capabilities of social groups.‖ 
 
177 Pierson.  145 &146 ―the same set of actors who would lose influence as the result of 
an institutional reform must agree to any revision one would naturally expect a higher 
level of institutional resilience.‖  Thus, this has lead to ―self-referencing,‖ where 
institutional revision is hostage in the hands of the actors who control these 
institutions, and benefit out of them. 
 
178 Ibid. 10 & 105 ―particular institutions exist because it is expected to serve interests.‖ 
 
179 Ibid. 60 ―because the sequence in which alternative proposals are considered 
determines the eventual outcome, tremendous power rests with those actors who select 
the sequence.‖  62 ―the causal story is not about temporal order at all—it is about the 
institutional structure and the resources and preferences of the key strategic actors.  
Sequence reveals how powerful actors get what they want.‖ 
 
180 Michael E. O'Hanlon, "The Iraqi Constitution: Potentially Fatal Flaw", The Brookings 
Institution http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2005/0902iraq_ohanlon.aspx 
(accessed). and, Jonathan Morrow, "Weak Viability: The Iraqi Federal State and the 
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and institutionalized their behaviors.181  Through such means, these 
elites ―shifted the rules in their favor … and increased their own 
capacities for political action while diminishing those of their rivals … to 
reinforce their trends.‖182  Hence, these elites designed, wielded power, 
and determined the shape and characteristic of the entire state through 
the ―structure of rules‖ that bound actors even beyond the reach of the 
elites, formalizing their approach.183 This minimizes the possibilities for 
change in Iraq since this accounts for the resilience of the institutions 
that this paper is advocating to reform.184  Therefore, unless this system 
is reformed to promote moderation and unity, and unclog the political 
system, Iraq does not have a chance to become a stable, unified, and 
democratic country.185 Life support machines—coalition military 
presence and diplomatic pressure—will always be necessary;186 otherwise 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Constitutional Amendment Process", United States Institute For Peace 
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr168.html (accessed 10/21 2008). 
 
181 Michael E. O'Hanlon,   (accessed).  And: Morrow,   (accessed). 
 
182 Pierson. 36. 
 
183 Ibid. 60. 
 
184 Ibid. 106 ―particular institutions may be functional for powerful actors but quite 
dysfunctional for society as a whole.‖  142, 143, & 144. 
 
185 March and Olsen.  735 ―Historically, political theory has treated political institutions 
as determining, ordering, or modifying individual motives, and as acting autonomously 
in terms of institutional needs‖ 
 
186 III and others, The Iraq Study Group Report. 8 ―include milestones that can 
strengthen the government and benefit the Iraqi people … If the Iraqi government 
demonstrates political will and makes substantial progress toward the achievement of 
milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance‖  16 ―Maliki has publicly 
rejected a U.S. timetable to achieve certain benchmarks, ordered the removal of 
blockades around Sadr City, sought more control over Iraqi security forces, and resisted 
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Iraqi and international efforts will fail, resources will be wasted,187 and 
the world will suffer dire consequences of such a failure, as this study 
demonstrates in its conclusion. 
For all of these reasons, the situation in Iraq is as it is today.188 So 
far, and after more than six years, not a single goal of the original 
objective of OIF has been achieved.  Moreover, after all the invested 
efforts, and costs, still an understanding among the Iraqi elites on basic 
issues like the accountability and reconciliation law—also known as 
Debathification,—the revenue sharing law, a genuine and proper DDR, 
etc., are not attained. What makes this picture even gloomier is that the 
goals, ideologies, and, agendas of the majority of these entities runs 
counter to the American objective in Iraq.  As such, the political process 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
U.S. requests to move forward on reconciliation or on disbanding Shiite militias.‖  19       
―Though Prime Minister Maliki has said he will address the problem of militias, he has 
taken little meaningful action to curb their influence. He owes his office in large part to 
Sadr and has shown little willingness to take on him or his Mahdi Army.‖ 
 
187 Abdul-Ahad. Three officers from the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INSI) stated 
that: ―Observers not steeped in Iraqi history might be bemused to find that six years 
after the toppling of a dictator, after the death of several hundred thousand Iraqis, a 
brutal insurgency, trillions of wasted dollars and more than 4,000 dead US soldiers, the 
country is being rebuilt along very familiar lines: concentration of power, shadowy 
intelligence services and corruption.‖ 
 
188 Conducting a Conflict Assessment - a Framework for Strategy and Program 
Development. 31 ―conflict is extremely complex. It doesn't occur simply because people 
are unhappy or greedy or because a country happens to have the resources in place 
that might sustain violence. Nor does it happen everywhere state and social institutions 
are weak or perverse. It happens when causes found at multiple levels come together 
and reinforce each other. Ultimately the product of deep grievance, political and 
economic competition, irresponsible political leadership, weak and unaccountable 
institutions, and global and regional forces.‖ 
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in Iraq became the major obstacle in achieving the strategic objective of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom.     
Given what has been discussed and documented this far, one 
cannot help but ask whether Iraq is a democracy, or even on the path to 
becoming a democracy?  The unfortunate answer to both questions is 
no.189  Then, another issue surfaces: If Iraq is not a democracy, why not? 
                                                             
189 Thomas Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm," Journal of Democracy 13, 
no. 1 (January 2002).  Iraq holds the worst characteristics of feckless pluralism, and 
some characteristics of dominant power politics: 9, 10, 11 & 15 ―have some attributes of 
democratic political life … regular elections and democratic constitutions. Yet they 
suffer from serious democratic deficits, often including poor representation of citizens‘ 
interests, low levels of political participation beyond voting, frequent abuse of the law by 
government officials, elections of uncertain legitimacy, and very low levels of public 
confidence in state institutions, and persistently poor institutional performance by the 
state… As a first analytic step, two broad political syndromes can be seen to be 
common in the gray zone … The first syndrome is feckless pluralism … where 
democracy remains shallow and troubled. Political participation, though broad at 
election time, extends little beyond voting. Political elites from all the major parties or 
groupings are widely perceived as corrupt, self-interested, and ineffective. The 
alternation of power seems only to trade the country‘s problems back and forth from 
one hapless side to the other. Political elites from all the major parties are widely 
perceived as corrupt, self-interested, dishonest, and not serious about working for their 
country. The public is seriously disaffected from politics, and … extremely unhappy 
about the political life of the country. Overall, politics is widely seen as a stale, corrupt, 
elite-dominated domain that delivers little good to the country and commands equally 
little respect. And the state remains persistently weak.  Economic policy is often poorly 
conceived and executed, and economic performance is frequently bad or even 
calamitous. Social and political reforms are similarly tenuous, and successive 
governments are unable to make headway on most of the major problems facing the 
country, from crime and corruption to health, education, and public welfare generally … 
There are many variations of feckless pluralism. In some cases, the parties that 
alternate power between them are divided by paralyzing acrimony and devote their time 
out of power to preventing the other party from accomplishing anything at all … In 
other cases, the main competing groups end up colluding, formally or informally, 
rendering the alternation of power unhelpful in a different manner … In some countries 
afflicted with feckless pluralism, the political competition is between deeply entrenched 
parties that essentially operate as patronage networks and seem never to renovate 
themselves, … These varied cases nonetheless share a common condition that seems at 
the root of feckless pluralism—the whole class of political elites, though plural and 
competitive, are profoundly cut off from the citizenry, rendering political life an 
ultimately hollow, unproductive exercise…‖  As for dominant power politics Iraq retains 
the following characteristics ―… the blurring of the line between the state and the ruling 
party (or ruling political forces). The state‘s main assets—that is to say, the state as a 
source of money, jobs, public information (via state media), and police power—are 
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And, why have all these efforts failed to produce the desired results?  The 
answer is that the efforts have not produced a democracy because of the 
mischaracterization of the root cause of the problem in Iraq as stated 
earlier.  Strategies that aim to answer the problems in Iraq and fulfill the 
strategic objective of OIF must correctly assess the nature of the 
problems in order to formulate the way forward.   
The conflict in Iraq is largely understood to be sectarian or ethnic, 
when this conflict is actually and overwhelmingly a power struggle.  
Moreover, the dominant elites in Iraq, and the political system that has 
been emplaced in Iraq, neither allow for consolidation of democracy, nor 
even for stability. Therefore, the system implemented in Iraq has failed 
because it presupposes that:  
 To preserve their position in government … 
community leaders are thought to promote conciliation 
among their followers and to encourage acceptance of 
the settlement. Under these arrangements, each 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
gradually put in the direct service of the ruling party … the blurring of the line between 
the state and the ruling party (or ruling political forces). The state‘s main assets—that is 
to say, the state as a source of money, jobs, public information (via state media), and 
police power—are gradually put in the direct service of the ruling party… In many 
―transitional countries,‖ reasonably regular, genuine elections are held but political 
participation beyond voting remains shallow and governmental accountability is weak. 
The wide gulf between political elites and citizens in many of these countries turns out 
to be rooted in structural conditions, such as the concentration of wealth or certain 
socio-cultural traditions that elections themselves do not overcome. It is also striking 
how often electoral competition does little to stimulate the renovation or development of 
political parties in many gray-zone countries.‖ So Iraq is a combination of feckless 
pluralism, and Dominant Power Politics, where it combines the negative connotations of 
both. And:  Terry L. Mitchell, "Is Iraq a Real Democracy?", The American Chronicle 
http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/98275 (accessed 04/13/ 2009).  ―I 
have a hard time buying into the notion that Iraq is a true democracy. Yes, since the 
U.S. forced Saddam Hussein from power, Iraq has conducted free and open elections 
and has selected its own leaders. However, there´s more to a democracy than just 
elections, and I see Iraq as lacking in some of the other things that make a democracy a 
democracy. Two of them specifically lead me to question that country´s status as such.‖ 
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distinct religious, linguistic or nationalistic community, 
it is argued, will feel that their voice counts and the 
rules of the game are fair and legitimate, as their 
leaders are in a position to express their concerns and 
protect their interests within the legislature and within 
government.190 
In Iraq, the elites have instigated the violence, not the masses.  
Such a system would provide a remedy for a conflict that is mass-lead; 
not for a conflict that is lead by self-absorbed elites, which would prey 
even on masses from their own identities to strengthen their positions.191  
Therefore, such a system does not answer to the problems in Iraq. 
Tarik Al-Hashimi the Vice President of Iraq, called for ―the 
restructuring of the Presidency Council and Cabinet by doing away with 
the sectarian quota.‖192  Al-Hashimi ―called for the formation of a 
national salvation government based on patriotism and away from 
sectarianism … He said: ‗We have to move quickly, and I place before my 
fellow Iraqi citizens and politicians an urgent salvation plan to end the 
                                                             
190 Norris, Stable Democracy and Good Governance in Divided Societies: Do Power-
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191 Duss and Juul.  1  ―The elections and their aftermath promise to be contentious and 
potentially bloody as Iraq‘s three main ethnic and religious groups—the minority Kurds 
and Sunni Arabs and the majority Shia Arabs—vie for power. More troubling still, 
factions within each of these ethnic and sectarian groups will contend for power in the 
regions they dominate—using local patronage and control of Iraq‘s resources, revenues, 
and guns, as well as appeals based on longstanding religious traditions in Iraq … three 
dominant and fiercely independent Shia political organizations—the Da‘wa Party, the 
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, or ISCI, and the Sadrists, along with the smaller but 
still significant Fadhila—will attempt through the ballot box and armed conflict to 
secure a majority of Shia votes in Iraq in order to lead the country‘s Shia-majority 
provinces.‖ 
 
192 Jamal,   (accessed). 
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distribution of posts (according to sects, religions and identity) for the 
sake of a wider participation.‘‖193 
As such, without reforming the existing political system and 
electoral process to answer to the Iraqi context‘s specificities, and 
without changing the dominant forces in Iraq and the way politics in Iraq 
are undertaken today, Iraq‘s best hedge for lasting stability is the 
reversion to autocracy.  The Iraq Study Group concluded that ―the Iraqi 
people could be subjected to another strongman who flexes the political 
and military muscle required to impose order amid anarchy.194 Freedoms 
could be lost.‖195 Furthermore, Paul Bremer acknowledged that 
compromise on such elements of democracy as a ―professional, and 
uncorrupted police force, human rights … no militias‖,196 none of which 
has been successfully attained, can lead the situation in Iraq to ―descend 
into chaos or civil war or tyranny—or all three.‖197    
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194 Abdul-Ahad.  Three officers from the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INSI) stated 
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195 III and others, The Iraq Study Group Report.  28. 
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To cite an example in recent history, Iraq‘s best hope under the 
current setup is to develop along the lines of Russia‘s transition after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.198  The obsession of the Russian elites with 
their selfish power and interests199 is similar to the picture this study is 
drawing about the dominant Iraqi elites. 
In 1991, 70% of the Russian population was ―prepared to see 
Russia move toward a liberal democracy.‖200  Many of the Russian people 
―were unsure what exactly democracy was, but they accepted it as both 
an idea and as a way of life.‖201  As developments took place, uncertainty 
and instability became rampant, the Russian people‘s main concerns 
came to be safety, wellbeing, order, and, stability.202  The outcome is 
that, in 2006, 71% of Russians regretted the dissolution of the USSR,203 
and, supported and embraced the reversal of the democratization 
process.204  Iraqis also wanted to see a democratic Iraq.205  From dancing 
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199 Lilia Shevtsova, Russia Lost in Transition:  The Yeltsim and Putin Legacies (Carnegie 
Endowment For International Peace, 2007). 10 ―Yeltsin and his ruling team … not only 
did they not try to establish a new national consensus on democratic reforms, their 
egocentrism deepened the divisions within the society, goading elites into warring 
among themselves over who was to get their hands on property and power … the elite 
that rose to the top after the collapse of the USSR was split into competing groups each 
claiming monopoly on power.‖ 
 
200 Ibid. 13. 
 
201 Ibid. 13. 
 
202 Ibid. 16. 
 
203 Ibid. 16. 
 
204 Ibid. 16 & 37. 
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in the streets and welcoming Americans as liberators to where Iraq is 
today,206 the resemblance with the Russian people‘s shift in mood is 
stark.  
There is a particular characteristic of the Russian transition‘s end 
result which would be particularly repellent to America.  The Russian de-
democratization207 came hand-in-hand with a casting aside of all the 
policies of ―Western integration.‖208  Russia is currently promoting a 
vision that is characterized by anti-western and anti-American 
hegemony,209 if not outright anti-Americanism.210  This anti-Western 
stance resonates with many Russians211 because the Russian transition 
was seen by ordinary Russians as a Western and an American initiative.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
205 III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 204. 
 
206 Sodaro. 259 ―public acceptance—which was fairly high after among Iraqis in the first 
months after the war—deteriorated rapidly.‖ 
 
207 Tilly. 14 ―Democratization means net 'involvement toward broader, more equal, more 
protected, and more binding consultation. De-democratization, obviously, then means- 
net movement toward narrower, more unequal, less protected, and less binding 
consultation.‖  & 15 ―Net movement of a regime toward the higher ends of the four 
dimensions—breadth of popular inclusion, equality among citizens, protection against 
arbitrary actions of the states, mutually binding consultation among the state and the 
citizenry—qualifies as democratization. Net movement toward the lower ends qualifies 
as de-democratization.‖  Also see: Carothers. 9-14. 
 
208 Dmitri Trenin, "The Lonely Power: Russian Security Policy and the West", Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22683&prog=
zru&zoom_highlight=Russian (accessed 03/03/ 2009). 
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The consequences felt by the Russians were daunting,212 leading them to 
blame the west and America for their misfortunes.213   Iraqis likewise see 
the Americans as the driving force behind the change, and attribute the 
consequences—good or bad—largely to such an intervention.214  Of 
course in the case of Iraq, America‘s direct military intervention has 
understandably evoked the conclusion that America is indeed 
responsible for the change and its consequences.215     
It is highly unlikely that any American decision-maker would like 
to see an outcome similar to the one in Russia, in the heart of the Middle 
East, in a predominantly Arab and Muslim country.  Such an anti-
American posture in this vital but volatile region can prove to be a very 
consequential issue.  Just as in the case of the Russian drift away from 
democracy, it would be an unfortunate and devastating development for 
America.  Not to mention, what a terrible waste of numerous lives and 
enormous efforts and resources such a scenario in the case of Iraq would 
represent. 
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indeed been shocked and awed by the speed and precision with which the coalition had 
crushed Saddam Hussien‘s vaunted Republican Guard and overthrown the Baathis 
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once the tanks stopped rolling.‖ The failure to do so increased ―the resolve and 
confidence of Iraqi insurgents and terrorists.‖  & 160 ―the Iraqi minister of Justice 
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Chapter III:  
History—A Source For Lessons And Remedies 
Iraq today finds itself faced with problems similar to those faced by 
the United States of America after its Declaration of Independence216 and 
the formation of the confederation.217 Just as rampant factional interests 
threatened America,218 factional interests in Iraq today are, at best, 
threatening the prospects of a democratic Iraq, if not Iraq as a nation.   
The type of government created under the American Articles of 
Confederation was too weak, and the union was malfunctioning.219 The 
states were failing to comply with their duties under the Articles of 
Confederation.220 Many Americans realized that the survival of the 
United States of America and its prosperity was contingent upon 
solidifying and strengthening the union.221 General George Washington 
wrote: 
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It appears to me there is an option still left to the 
United States of America … whether they will become 
respectable and prosperous, or contemptible and 
miserable, as a nation… this is the moment to establish 
or ruin their national character forever; this is the 
favorable moment to give such a tone to our federal 
government, as we‘ll enable it to answer the ends of its 
institutions, or this may be the ill-fated moment for 
relaxing the powers of the Union, annihilating the 
cement of the confederation, and exposing us to become 
the sports of European politics … according to the 
system of policy the states shall adopt at this moment, 
they will stand or fall; and by their confirmation or 
lapse it is yet to be decided, whether the revolution 
must ultimately be considered as a blessing or a curse 
… not to the present age alone, for with our fate will the 
destiny of unborn millions be involved … silence in me 
would be a crime … it will be part of my duty, and that 
of every true patriot, to assert without reserve, and to 
insist … that unless the States will suffer congress to 
those prerogatives they are undoubtedly invested with 
by the constitution, everything must very rapidly tend 
to anarchy and confusion. That it is indispensable to 
the happiness of the individual states, that there 
should be lodged somewhere a supreme power to 
regulate and govern the general concerns of the 
confederated republic ….222  
It is puzzling that American policymakers failed to draw such 
parallels and apply, to Iraq, lessons learned from the American 
experience.223  It is even more puzzling that bright politicians like Vice 
President Joseph R. Biden Jr. advocated, in 2006, a solution to the 
overall problems in Iraq that would promote more factionalism by further 
dividing the country into distinct Shiite, Sunni, and, Kurdish regions.224  
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This is the exact opposite of the measures that America undertook to 
overcome a very similar situation—to revise the Articles of Confederation 
and establish a government ―adequate to the exigencies of the Union.‖225   
Had America‘s founding fathers approached the problems facing 
their country in the way that American strategists and policymakers are 
approaching the problems facing Iraq, America as we know it would not 
have survived.  Instead, the founding fathers of America were prudent 
enough to devise a system that transformed a loose union into a strong 
unified nation.  As such, America arose from a country that was unable 
to raise money to meet its financial obligations226 and raise arms to 
defend itself,227 to become a superpower.   
Given the challenges Iraq is facing today—the nature of its elites, 
the characteristics of its political system, the fate of Iraqi citizens, and 
the outcome of its experience so far—there are two lessons to be drawn 
from the American experience during its first century.  These lessons are 
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fundamental to defining the future of Iraq and the course of its nascent 
democratic experience: First, like America, Iraq must consolidate and 
strengthen its political system and its fragmented government.  This will 
enable Iraq‘s government to rise to the challenges it faces, and to look 
after the interests of the people it represents, rather than being torn by 
bickering faction, as is the case in Iraq now.  It is absolutely essential for 
the sustainability of the Iraqi democratic experience, like American, Iraq 
must protect against a backlash, consolidate its political system, and 
advance democracy.  In short, such a measure is vital for the Iraqi 
experiment to succeed. Otherwise, prospects of democratization in Iraq 
will suffer severe setbacks, for, either Iraq will be subjected to another 
brutal dictator, or it will become the ―sports‖228  of other countries.  Just, 
as General George Washington explained, in his circular letter, how such 
a measure was important for the survival of America, the same applies 
today for Iraq.  It is time to decide on the future of Iraq.  Is Iraq to be a 
consolidated democracy? Dissolve into chaos and anarchy? Or will it 
revert to dictatorship?229 A choice must be made: Iraqis must 
                                                             
228 Greene. 437– 444 ―The time of … Political Probation‖: George Washington‘s circular 
letter to the States (June 8, 1783). 
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―establish‖230 or ―ruin their national character forever;‖ 231 they must 
enable their government ―to answer the ends of its institutions, or this 
may be the ill-fated moment for relaxing its powers.‖232 
In the mean-time, just as General George Washington warned, the 
suggested consolidation must avoid the oppression that occurs by 
vesting too much power in single government that presides over the 
whole of Iraq.233  And, as Benjamin Rush explains ―absolute power 
should never be trusted to man.  It has perverted the wisest heads, and 
corrupted the best hearts in the world.‖234 In this respect, the 
responsibilities and powers must be assigned to different government 
branches.235 Each branch must have the means to check the conduct of 
the remaining two branches, and balance their authority.236 
The second lesson to be drawn from the American experience 
during its first century is that it is absolutely essential for the 
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government to rely on the will of people.237  As James Madison—the 
father of the American Constitution—stated: ―it is essential to liberty that 
the government in general should have a common interest with the 
people.‖238  Given the characteristics of the Iraqi context, the government 
should be directly accountable to the people.  This will ameliorate the 
vice of factional interests by accounting for the individual interests of 
citizens.    
Abraham Lincoln, in his Gettysburg address, summarized the 
importance of having the government rely for its power on the people and 
how such a government empowered by the people will enjoy durability 
and realize its goals: 
That we here highly resolve that these dead shall 
not have died in vain--that this nation … shall have a 
new birth of freedom—and that government of the 
people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish 
from the earth.239 
The following Chapter proposes a system that will minimize 
factionalism while ensuring the widest possible popular participation.  
The government in the proposed system relies on the widest possible 
                                                             
237 Ibid. 347 & 359   The preamble, Article 1, Section 1 & Article VI [The Constitution of 
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over the states in the House of Representatives and through its supremacy clause. 
 
238 James Madison, in The Federalist, ed. Jacob E. Cooke (Middletown: Wesleyan 
University Press, 1787). 355 [The Federalist No. 52 - To the People of the State New 
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239 "16. Abraham Lincoln 1861-1865", The White House 
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support of the citizens; at the same time, it guarantees unity of command 
that is checked by institutional oversight.   
Such measures will break the tight control of elites over Iraq, and 
break the ongoing clientelistic240 patterns of despotism carried on from 
previous eras.  The goal, opportunity and challenge central to this 
chapter and, indeed, the entire study best captured in  Richard Price‘s 
letter  ―‗A New Prospect in Human Affairs‘ … ‗Observation on the 
importance of the American Revolution‘ (1784):‖ 
That the members of a civil community are … 
not subjects; and their rulers, servants, not masters.—
And that all legitimate government consists in the 
dominion of equal laws made with common consent; 
that is, in the dominion of men over themselves; and 
not in the dominion of communities over communities, 
or of any men over other men … The Present moment, 
however auspicious to the united States if wisely 
approved, is critical; and, though apparently the end of 
all their dangers, may prove the time their greatest 
danger …  Should … excessive jealousy district their 
governments; and, clashing interests, subject to no 
controul, break the federal union—the consequences 
will be, that he fairest experiment ever tried in human 
affairs will miscarry; and that a REVOLUTION which 
had revived the hopes of good men and promised an 
opening to better times, will become a discouragement 
to all future efforts in favour of liberty, and prove only 
                                                             
240 Brian Kermath, "What Is Cliemtelism?", University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point 
http://www.uwsp.edu/cnr/gem/ambassador/what_is_clientelism.htm (accessed 
04/10/ 2009).  ―Clientelism refers to a form of social organization common in many 
developing regions characterized by ‗patron-client‘ relationships. In such places, 
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exploitative, often resulting in the perpetual indebtedness of the clients in what is 
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intimidation, sabotage, and even violence to maintain control, and some fail to deliver 
on their promises. Moreover, patrons are often unaccountable for their actions. Thus, 
clientelistic relationships are often corrupt and unfair, thereby obstructing the 
processes of implementing true sustainability.‖ 
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an opening to a new scene of human degeneracy and 
misery.241 
The system proposed in this study thus provides for leaders that 
fall on their merits rather than their identities, and provides them the 
incentives to ―preserve, protect, and defend‖242 Iraq, its citizens as Iraqis, 
and its democratic experience.  The proposed system will allow for the 
emergence of leaders that ―strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind 
up the nation's wounds....‖243 
Further, Thomas Jefferson‘s remarks on the Virginia Constitution 
typically applies to the case of Iraq: i.e.,244  
This constitution was formed when we were new 
and un-experienced in the science of government … No 
wonder then that time and trial have discovered very 
capital defects in it … The majority of the men in the 
state, who pay and fight for its support, are 
unrepresented … among those who share the 
representation, the shares are very unequal.245   
The Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri Al-Maliki, seems to have a similar 
conviction.  Al-Maliki has stated the current political system is a major 
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challenge in the way of progress in Iraq.246  On Saturday, November, 8 
2008, Al-Maliki, acknowledged that the Iraqi constitution was written ―‗in 
haste,‘ when Iraq was in a ‗transitional stage,‘ and that the time has 
come to revise it.‖247  He stated that Iraqis went too far in enshrining 
fears and insecurities of the past into the political system.  These fears 
and insecurities were translated in the form of sectarian and ethnic 
quotas.  Furthermore, Al-Maliki stated this is restricting the government, 
wasting the Iraqi capabilities, and, imposing inefficient figures on the 
Iraqi political system.  He also called on Iraqis to reconsider the form of 
the Iraqi political system.248 Al-Maliki stressed the necessity for clearly 
defining the jurisdictions of the central and provincial governments249 
and, advocated a strong central government.250  The Iraqi people seem to 
agree also on such a vision,251 for, Al-Maliki ran on such a platform, and 
the people rewarded him.252  He won the elections by large margins253 
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considering Iraq‘s proportional representation system.  He ousted rival 
political entities in the Shiite provinces that wanted to further fragment 
Iraq along sectarian lines by establishing a purely Shiite region in the 
south.254  The defeat of these factions is testimony that the majority of 
Shiites are against such a concept.255 However, as emphasized 
throughout this study, the interactions of elites and the electoral system 
are hindering translating the voters‘ choice to authority.256  
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Chapter IV:  
Reforming the Iraqi Electoral system 
Restructuring the electoral system is vital to achieve the strategic 
objective of OIF.  Former Iraqi Prime Minister, Ayad Allawi, rightly stated 
that: 
 Unfortunately, neither Washington nor the 
government of Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki seems to 
understand that reconciliation between Iraq‘s ethnic 
and religious groups will begin only when we change 
the flawed electoral system … This restructuring of the 
electoral process will be the beginning of the end of the 
sectarianism that now dominates Iraqi politics and our 
dysfunctional government.257      
Electoral systems in any state are consequential, and vital for 
shaping any political system.258  The characteristics of any state highly 
depend on its political system.259  The political system determines how 
people are represented, how the institutions are shaped and developed, 
and even highly influences the actions of the elites.260  Electoral systems 
determine the ―structure of the party system, the ways in which 
                                                             
257 Allawi. 
 
258 Sisk.  1, 2, & 3   And:  Stone.  288 & 295.  Also see: Horowitz. 116. 
 
259 Sisk. 1 ―the political pathway of transition and especially the initial, post-war 
electoral process matters for significantly for state-building. The transition sequences 
and institutional choices made in war-settlement negotiations often determine the 
nature and timing of initial post-war elections; in turn, these electoral processes deeply 
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260 Stone. 354, 355, 356 & 375  and:  March and Olsen. 738 ―the new institutionalism 
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and social conditions but also on the design of political institutions.‖ 
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candidates craft their appeals, and the overall character of the 
contest.‖261    
The first step must be to tackle the dangers of a faction.  As James 
Madison wrote ―Among the numerous advantages promised by a well 
constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed that 
its tendency to break and control the violence of faction … this 
dangerous vice.‖262  The objective of the formation of government must be 
―to secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a 
faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of 
popular government.‖263   
The chapter proposes politically systemic changes that foster 
democratic political competition based on the interests of the people 
rather than identities.  Furthermore, such changes are required to 
ensure smooth and decisive action by a unified government to meet its 
obligations264 rather than a government torn by the struggle of power, 
and the vice of faction.  The advocated solution is based on the necessity 
to settle and filter differences outside the government, and through 
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electoral competition.265 The theoretical foundation for such a remedy is 
that: 
Elections are the principal means … to 
determine initial control of state institutions by either 
affirming existing patterns of power or ushering in new 
elites and by re-arranging state-society relations … the 
extent to which electoral processes contribute to 
capable, responsive states and to other alternatives 
such as captured, fragmented, or weak states … In 
some circumstances, electoral processes are the critical 
turning point that ends an uncertain, and usually 
turbulent, transition period and may in fact be the key 
ingredient in moving beyond the vulnerabilities of post-
war settings to ongoing political violence.266 
 Such ―‗electoral engineering‘—changing the formal electoral 
rules—has the capacity to generate major consequences by altering the 
strategic behavior of politicians, parties, and citizens.‖267  ―The challenge 
… is to devise electoral rules that compel serious candidates to secure 
significant cross-factional support.‖268 
Essentially, instead of the infusion of powers, the concept of 
separation of powers needs to be introduced in Iraq.269   Each branch of 
government—legislative, executive, and, judicial—must not depend on 
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any other branch for its existence, but on the will of the people.270  Each 
branch of government needs to have separate responsibilities,271 as well 
as authorities to examine the performance of the other branches and 
balance their power.    
While the purely parliamentary system needs to be revoked,272 the 
proposed remedy does not follow the rigid and clear theoretical line of 
political systems273 proscribed in political science—Parliamentary, 
Presidential,274 or semi-Presidential.275 Instead, the reformed system 
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274 "The Presidentialization of Politics in Democratic Societies: A Framework for 
Analysis," in The Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern 
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democracy is for the president to be popularly elected, either directly by the people or 
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Presidential regimes are characterized by uni-personal executive responsibility. Under 
presidentialism, only the president is mandated to govern by the people, and therefore, 
only he or she is politically accountable. This does not mean, of course, that the 
executive literally comprises a single individual; the US President, for instance, appoints 
the members of his cabinet, who take charge of policy in different government 
departments, but they are not individually responsible to the electorate (or to the 
legislature, given the separation of powers which operates). Only the president himself 
64 
 
advocated here shares some characteristics of the parliamentary, mixed 
presidential and purely presidential systems.276  Central to the advocated 
alternative is the creation of direct state-society relations, and, the 
presidentialization of politics.277  This conforms to the specificities of the 
Iraqi cultural context. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
has a personal democratic mandate, which means that he has complete authority to 
hire and fire members of his cabinet, and they are accountable directly to him: he then 
carries responsibility for the entire administration … It seems to us that these three 
features of a popularly elected executive, the separation of executive and legislative 
power, and uni-personal executive responsibility constitute the necessary and sufficient 
formal conditions which define presidentialism in a legal-constitutional sense. While the 
actual autonomy and power of a president may vary considerably within these 
constitutional parameters according to a variety of contingent and institutional factors, 
it nevertheless remains formally a presidential regime.‖   
 
275 Ibid. 3 ―semi-presidential regimes are 'double-engine systems' characterized by 
dyarchic executives. That is, not only do they have popularly elected heads of state who 
are politically not responsible to the legislature and have a degree of real executive 
power, but this power must also in some way be shared with a separate prime minister, 
the latter being formally the head of a government which emerges from the legislature 
and is responsible to it (Duverger 1980 ; Linz 1994 : 48; Sartori 1994 : 131ff.; Elgie 
1999 : 13). 
 
Thus, a semi-presidential regime mixes core elements of presidentialism 
and parliamentarism. Its actual working mode is directly dependent upon presence or 
absence of party political congruence between the president and the parliamentary 
majority.‖ 
 
276 Hazan. 27, 30 ―The Israeli reformers have attempted to create a system that will be 
the best of both worlds. Their aim was to maintain their parliamentary system, 
tempering its drawbacks by introducing the positive elements of a presidential system, 
while avoiding the disruptive and unstable characteristics of both pure regime types;‖  
31 ―Israel will, therefore, move away from the parliamentary form of governments and 
into a unique and hybrid category, but will not transform itself into a presidential 
regime. Israel will no longer be purely parliamentary, but it will also not conform to the 
pure presidential type;‖ 32 ―If Israel is not presidential, nor even semi-presidential, then 
maybe a hybrid model,‖ 33 ―Israel, in short, will move out of the pure parliamentary 
category but will definitely not become purely presidential, nor semi-presidential,‖ & 35.  
 
277 "The Presidentialization of Politics in Democratic Societies: A Framework for 
Analysis."   1  ―personalization, and in particular, the 'presidentialization' of politics 
have become more widespread in recent years, regardless of formal constitutional 
characteristics. For instance, in the United Kingdom long-standing concerns about 
prime ministerial power have occasionally produced assertions of 'presidential' rule, 
most notably in the work of Foley (1993 , 2000) …  presidentialization denominates a 
process by which regimes are becoming more presidential in their actual practice 
without, in most cases, changing their formal structure, that is, their regime-type.‖  & 
3&4 ―The preceding discussion has shown that presidential systems offer far more 
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The Iraqi National Assembly and the Chief Executive must be 
elected directly by the people.278  The following measures are suggested 
to reform the electoral rules pertaining to the executive and legislative 
branches of Iraqi state. 
A. Under the proposed system, the chief executive—as opposed to the head 
of state279—is directly elected by the people.280 ―Popular mandate is an 
essential precondition of the executive‘s democratic legitimacy and, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
executive power resources to the leader of the executive while, at the same time, giving 
him or her considerable autonomy vis-à-vis the political parties in parliament (and vice 
versa). Essentially, the inherent functional logic of presidential regimes has three 
effects: Leadership power resources … Leadership autonomy … Personalization of the 
electoral process … It follows from this that the de facto presidentialization of politics 
can be understood as the development of (a) increasing leadership power resources and 
autonomy within the party and the political executive respectively, and (b) increasingly 
leadership-centered electoral processes. Essentially, three central arenas of democratic 
government are affected by theses changes, which we may refer to as three faces of 
presidentialization, namely the executive face, the party face, and the electoral face, 
respectively. Presidentialization as a process means that these three faces of 
presidentialization are amplified by factors other than those flowing directly from the 
formal constitutional structure.  In principle, all regime-types can move (to varying 
degrees) between partified and presidentialized forms of government. How closely they 
approach either of the opposing poles of this continuum is determined by a wide range 
of underlying structural factors (such as changes in the social structure and the media 
system) and contingent factors (such as the personality of leaders).‖ 
 
278 Solberg.  347 & 354  Article 1, Section 1 & Article 2 Section 1 [The Constitution of 
the United States]  and: Hazan. 25 ―an electoral reform which synthesized both 
parliamentary and presidential systems of government-the Prime Minister would no 
longer be chosen by the parliament following post-election coalition bargaining, but 
would be directly elected by the population in a separate ballot.‖ 
 
279 Hazan. 30 ―the direct election of the head of government, as opposed to the head of 
state, will put Israel in an even smaller group.‖ 
 
280 "The Presidentialization of Politics in Democratic Societies: A Framework for 
Analysis."  1   and:  Hazan. 28 ―the Prime Minister will be chosen based on general, 
national, direct, equal, and secret elections. The tenure of the Prime Minister is to be 
concurrent with that of the Knesset (four years), and they are to be elected 
simultaneously.‖ & 31 ―In the Israeli case the chief executive will be selected directly by 
the electorate.‖  & 33 ―the terminology of calling the popularly elected executive leader 
in Israel by the title of Prime Minister, instead of President.‖ 
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therefore, for his or her personal authority to govern.‖281  As such, s/he 
will be mainly responsible to the electorate,282 and less responsible to 
political elites.  This will also immensely increase the legitimacy of the 
government.283   
Also, the chief executive will be able to appoint the members of 
his/her branch of government.284  Of course the confirmation of cabinet 
members is contingent upon the approval of parliament, to check, and 
balance the authority of the executive.285   
According to the Iraqi constitution, the Prime Minister is the chief 
executive; therefore, the PM will be able to appoint cabinet members.  
This will promote cohesiveness286 and unity inside the cabinet.287  Hence, 
this step will also lead to a more durable,288 effective, and stable 
system.289    
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287 Blais. 241.   
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Further, such a change will allow for a clearer and much more 
transparent allocation of responsibility, and will, therefore, facilitate the 
process of government accountability,290 since only the executive is 
accountable to the people and the legislative for his/her own 
performance—uni-personal responsibility.291 It will be quite evident 
where to place the blame.  Unlike the current multi-party, proportional, 
consociational, and parliamentary system that is emplaced in Iraq, 
blame, under the proposed system cannot be diffused.  There is a de 
facto ―uni-personal executive responsibility.‖292     
This proposed system also promotes autonomy in action.  The 
executive is far less dependent for his /her power on the legislative 
branch, or on parties and party elites.  Therefore, his/her main concern 
will be the people.  As such, the chief executive will be able to take 
decisive293 measures and necessary decisions without worrying about 
losing their power, even if the actions were directed against power nodes. 
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The presidentialized power of the state-society model will serve as a 
welcomed solution to patronage,294 corruption,295 interparty differences, 
and intraparty cleavages.296 The main source of executive power will 
reside in the public.297  Such an approach facilitates a transcending of 
the retroactive influence of political parties298 and political elites299 by 
directly interlinking the interests of the public and executive.   
However, a public that grants power to the executive; along with the 
other two branches of government—legislative and judiciary—holds the 
executive responsible and in check for her/his performance (see footnote 
for further explanation).300 
                                                             
294 Dagher, "Iraqi Report on Corruption Cites Prosecutors‘ Barriers." ―The real problem 
is the difficulty of prosecuting people for corruption, which is so widespread that it has 
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295 Ibid. ―‗The reason for the massive corruption in Iraq is the belief by the corrupt that 
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institution is riddled with corruption and cronyism.‖   
 
296 Hazan. 28 ―Moreover, direct popular elections became perceived as the 'real' change, 
almost as a panacea for curing the malaise of the entire system.‖ 
 
297 Stone.   307 persuasion is key for any person to rise to the office of chief executive.  
Since, s/he has to persuade diverse people of different backgrounds of his/her merits.  
Hence, ―by persuasion we bring out the highest human quality—the capacity to 
deliberate,‖ 308 ―the purpose of persuasion is to elicit active response.‖  & 309. 
 
298 "The Presidentialization of Contemporary Democratic Politics: Evidence,: Causes, 
and Consequences," in The Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern 
Democracies, ed. Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb (Oxford University Press, 2005). 3  
―While in office, the head of the executive is well protected against pressure from his 
own party.‖ 
 
299 Ibid. 3. 
 
300 To strengthen the check on the executive branch: Hazan. 29 ―the parliament can 
remove a minister with an extraordinary majority … the parliament can also oust the 
Prime Minister, as well, through a vote of no-confidence‖ by a super majority of 85% 
69 
 
The formula works as follows: The greater the level of satisfaction 
among the public, the stronger the executive,301 and the less space there 
is available for parties to maneuver. Consequently, if the executive fails 
to serve the public‘s interest, then the checks and balances formula of 
the separation of powers becomes active.  This step will create double 
pressure on the executive, and a greater momentum for checks and 
balances, particularly when both the legislative and the public join to 
exert pressure on the executive.  Furthermore, parties and political elites 
marginalized by this system will become vocal in outlining any mischief 
on the part of the executive.302   They will become quick to recognize and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
and the approval of the president or the presidency council. ―the removal of the Prime 
Minister brings about the dissolution of the parliament as well, meaning that new 
elections will be necessary for both … the Prime Minister-with the support of the 
President, a symbolic position elected by the Parliament-has the power to dissolve the 
parliament, but such a step would also end the Prime Minister's own tenure and force 
new elections.‖  Furthermore, since there are concerns that: Juan Linz, "Presidential or 
Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?," in The Failure of Presidential 
Democracy. Comparative Perspectives. , ed. Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). 13 ―there is no way to hold 
accountable a president who cannot be presented for reelection. Such a president can 
neither be punished by the voters by defeat nor rewarded for success by reelection with 
the same or a larger vote than in the previous election. A president who cannot be 
reelected is ‗unaccountable.‘‖  Hence, to hold the chief executive further accountable 
s/he will be able to rerun for elections; 17 & 18 However, to mitigate the fear of 
concentration of power and possible manipulation and abuse of power by the chief 
executives—in the case of Iraq the Prime Minister—as well as the fear of seizing power 
in undemocratic means, s/he cannot hold official posts for two consecutive terms.  This 
means that the chief executive at a given term will be forbidden from holding any official 
office in the next term.  This will incentivize the chief executive to further heed to 
his/her responsibilities by providing for continuity, while at the same time mitigating 
the risks of allowing a person to hold the post consecutively and/or indefinitely, hence, 
institutionally prevent any person from seizing power and abusing his/her authority. 
 
301 "The Presidentialization of Contemporary Democratic Politics: Evidence,: Causes, 
and Consequences." 3 ―power to lead depends directly on his electoral appeal. In other 
words, leadership autonomy may make for enhanced power to lead, but it is contingent 
upon electoral success.‖  And: Stone. 365. 
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reveal issues that might tarnish the executive‘s reputation and will do so 
to further their own self interests.   
The UN and the CPA dismissed this option.  The rationale for their 
decision was that under such a system—known as majoritairan—the 
winner takes all.  Hence, many people would be left out, and their views 
would go unrepresented.  As such, grievances would emerge and violence 
would escalate.  However, there is an answer to such a legitimate 
concern, and the answer forms the absolutely essential foundation of the 
proposed change.   
Given the context in Iraq, the requirements for electing the executive 
must not be only a 50%+ vote by the electorate, but the vote must be 
complemented by a condition that the candidate must acquire a certain 
percentage of votes in 16 out of the 18 provinces in Iraq.303  This is 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
302 March and Olsen. 738 the system of checks and balances as well as competition will 
minimize the ―Chief executives advocate reorganization of the public bureaucracy, 
announce plans for making reorganizations, and regularly abandon the plans.‖ 
 
303 Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?." 44 
Advocates of presidentialism argue that a president who is elected by a statewide 
electorate can serve as a symbol of integration in spite of ethnic divisions. The success 
of such symbolism obviously depends very much on the method of election chosen. A 
simple plurality in a single election, which might assure hegemony to the largest ethnic 
group, certainly would not work. The Nigerians have attempted to deal with the problem 
in their constitution by dividing the country into relatively Large, ethnically 
homogeneous states and requiring that a presidential candidate gain at least 25 percent 
of the votes in two-thirds of the states of the Nigerian Federation to assure that he does 
not represent any particular ethnic group or narrow coalition. The candidate must, 
therefore, seek support all over the country. A union of any two of the three largest 
groups behind a single candidate would not be sufficient support to reach the required 
threshold. The distribution formula assumes a territorial concentration of groups-that 
is, a certain level of homogeneity within areas but heterogeneity among areas.  And: 
Horowitz. 18&19 ―Interethnic and Interreligious Conciliation. Electoral systems that 
produce proportional results or accountability to constituents or durable governments 
may or may not foster interethnic conciliation. One way to think about electoral 
systems and interethnic conciliation is to ask whether a given system provides 
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necessary to prevent one faction (as a faction) of dominating the 
executive branch, as, for example would happen if the Shiites, or the 
Shiites and Kurds joined efforts against Sunnis.304   The percentage of 
votes must be considered a form of threshold, a threshold that can be 
calculated according to the number of minorities in the Iraqi provinces.  
For example, if the percentage of Shiites in the predominantly Sunni Al-
Anbar province is 8% and the percentage of Sunnis in the predominantly 
Shiite Basra province is 10%, then, the threshold should be set to be 
`11% or more.305   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
politicians with electoral inducements for moderate behavior … Similarly, systems that 
require candidates to achieve a regional distribution of votes, in addition to a national 
plurality, may foster conciliatory behavior if territory is a proxy for ethnicity because 
groups are regionally concentrated. Nigeria pioneered this approach in its presidential 
elections, and now Indonesia has gone in the same direction for its own presidential 
balloting. On the other hand, electoral systems that allow politicians to be elected 
without behaving moderately may make post-electoral conciliation more difficult. 
Coalitions that are created after elections merely to form a government of 50 percent 
plus one of the seats in parliament may prove to be fragile when divisive ethnic issues 
arise. So, for interethnic conciliation, the question is how the electoral system affects 
the pre-electoral calculations of parties and politicians.‖ & 126 ―The Indonesian 
constitution makers recently opted for a 50- percent-plus-one threshold plus a 
provincial distribution requirement, thereby making it especially difficult for any 
candidate to win on the first round if there are several candidates. It is important not to 
set thresholds for victory so high as to undo the benefits of the system being adopted. 
Electoral choice, in short, cannot stop at the level of the electoral system alone but 
must extend to all the details of implementing it so as to gain the benefits of the system 
that is preferred.‖ 
 
304 Stone.  365 ―the third argument of Madison … the larger the community, the greater 
the variety of parties and interests it will contain and the less likely any majority of 
members will have a common interests or ‗motive to invade the rights of other citizens.‘‖ 
 
305 To prevent an endless loop of electoral rounds, and an eventual stalemate, this 
system can be emplaced to filter candidates, as a formal—through national elections—
substitute to the primaries in US.  After the first two rounds, and distilling the 
candidates down to two, then the system can go back to be a normal majoritarian 
system.  Such a measure is suggested to remove any possible cloaks, and overcome 
stalemates. 
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This remedy not only provides people a voice in their government, but 
will also: (a) by default, institutionalize a veto and give a determining 
voice to Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds—given Iraq‘s demographic and 
geographic map—in choosing the chief executive; (b) promote moderate 
elites306 who believe in the strategic objective of OIF and the necessary 
means to fulfill that objective.307   Candidates who deploy a sectarian or 
ethnic rhetoric or who are known to have such tendencies will be 
disqualified at least by voters from other sects and ethnicities.308  As 
such, ―the candidate for the nomination, therefore, consciously or 
unconsciously acts as an agent of unification in attempting to find the 
common denominator of agreement among the largest number.‖309 
Importantly, every candidate will have to appeal to Shiite, Sunni, and 
Kurdish constituents.  Median and moderate approaches will most 
certainly be required to qualify for office and win the elections since the 
proposed threshold that is central to the proposed re-modification, will 
force those political actors310 to follow the new rules in order to maximize 
                                                             
306 Blais. 247 ―makes life tougher for those extremist parties which are the least likely to 
come to some agreement with other parties … the majority rule is that a system which 
produces representatives with strong and broad support and weakens extremist parties 
is likely to ensure legitimacy and order … The basic argument is that, because it makes 
sure that the elected have the clear support of the majority of voters and because it 
makes it difficult for anti-system parties to be represented, it ensures legitimacy and 
order, as indicated.‖ 
 
307 Ibid. 255 such system weakens extremist parties. 
 
308 Kerwin.  148 ―a candidate must exercise the greatest of care that he offend no large 
segment of the population‖ 
 
309 Ibid. 148. 
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their share of the votes and secure victory in elections.311  Equally 
important, the proposed threshold will either punish those political 
actors who are purely ideologues by excluding them from attaining office 
and marginalizing them, thus minimizing their impact,312 or force them 
to adopt and play according to the rules to gain power. 313 
Over time,314 such median approaches will influence the citizenry, 
establishing mutually reconstituting dynamics between political actors 
and the citizens.  It will also alter ―social norms, informal patterns of 
behavior, and social sanctions,‖315 and ―deep seated habitual patterns of 
behavior‖316 wherever and whenever they exist by reshaping such 
informal rules through the actions of the empowered elites, and their 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
310 Norris, Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior. 6 ―rational choice 
institutionalism assumes that formal electoral rules have a substantial impact upon the 
strategic incentives facing politicians, parties, and citizens, so that changing the formal 
rules has the capacity to alter political behavior.‖  7 ―the core theoretical claim in 
rational-choice institutionalism is that formal electoral rules generate important 
incentives that are capable of shaping and constraining political behavior … political 
actors are rational vote-maximizers in pursuit of electoral office who respond 
strategically to electoral incentives.‖   
 
311 Ibid. 7. 
 
312 Ibid. 7, 16, & 17. 
 
313 Ibid. 9 ―the Darwinian theory predicts that politicians who are not vote-maximizers, 
at least to some degree, will gradually become less common, because in general, they 
will be less successful in gaining elections or re-election.‖ 
 
314 Ibid. 5 ―the first ‗founding‘ contests held under any revised rules may prove 
anomalous and unstable, as citizens and parties learn the ropes, but their effects can 
be assessed more reliable after a decade of elections held under the revised 
arrangements.‖   &  ―reforms … have a cumulative in the longer term ….‖ 
 
315 Ibid. 7. 
 
316 Ibid. 16. 
74 
 
media campaigns.317  ―Citizens respond to the alternative electoral 
strategies adopted by political actors; they also respond directly to 
electoral rules affecting their role as citizens, with observable 
consequences evident in mass behavior.‖318 
The greatest challenge to such a system will come from the 
entrenched elites and the most powerful parties that dominate the Iraqi 
political arena since, their grip over Iraq will be threatened, their 
interests jeopardized, and their power endangered.319   
As for the Iraqi people in general, there is a fact that non-Iraqis seem 
to overlook:  The Iraqi population is sensitive to political figures other 
than those their sect or ethnicity but only when these figures undertake 
sectarian and ethnic approaches.320  With moderates, this problem does 
not seem to occur,321 as evidenced in the fact that Mithal Al-Alousi, a 
member of the purely Sunni Al-Alous tribe in Al-Anbar, was elected to 
parliament by votes of the Shiites in Karbala.   Al-Alousi is a stringent 
critic of Iran‘s role in Iraq, at the same time he is a moderate figure with 
no ethnic or sectarian biases.  Furthermore, a significant portion of the 
Shiite Ayad Allawi‘s—the Prime Minister of Iraq during the interim 
                                                             
317 Ibid. 7,  also see: 17. 
 
318 Ibid. 8. 
 
319 Hazan. 34 ―The perennial debate over the various proposed reforms of Israel's 
electoral and political system has been one of the most heated since the establishment 
of the State, but has essentially remained stalemated because it ran counter to 
immovable political interests.‖ 
 
320 III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 96, & 103. 
 
321 Hoagland.  Also see: Woodward. 221. 
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government—votes came from Sunnis in the 2004 transitional elections, 
and the 2005 elections general election, and in the 2009 provincial 
elections.322    
B. Voters must have the say in the Iraqi National assembly.  As James 
Madison stated: ―it is particularly essential that the branch of it under 
consideration—the legislative—should have an immediate dependence 
on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people.‖323   
There are two options to materialize the above stated imperative: 
First, direct vote to individual candidates—single member districts 
system.—Districts are to be represented by a single representative.  The 
personalized vote will oblige representatives to heed to their 
constituencies‘ grievances.  This is the only way for candidates to win 
elections.324  It will become very clear that a representative owes his/her 
position to the people and therefore must be attentive to their needs.325  
This will most definitely form a closer relationship between the 
constituent and the representative.326  Moreover, it is ―easier for voters to 
know their representatives, to convey to them their views on what the 
                                                             
322 Rubin, "Secular Parties and Premier Lead in Iraq ". 
 
323 Madison. 355 ―The Federalist No. 52 - To the People of the State New York.‖ 
 
324 Blais. 256. 
 
325 March and Olsen.  738 direct relation will create transparency that at least will 
minimize the adverse effects of recurrent political phenomena‘s to ―Politicians announce 
public support for positions they fail to defend in private.  Legislators vote for legislation 
while remaining indifferent to its implementation.‖ In matter that are of vital interest to 
the constituency, like services essential to life. 
 
326 Blais. 255 & 256.  And Stone. 298. 
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government should or should not do, and to reward or punish them for 
their performance‖327   
Furthermore, ―single-member districts appear to lead to 
representatives who have stronger constituency orientations and engage 
in more activities of benefit to their constituencies‖328 where, on the other 
hand, ―multi-member districts are conducive to weaker ties than single-
member ones.‖329  
Former Prime Minister Allawi supported this form of legislative 
elections. He called for district-based legislative elections where 
respective constituencies of a particular district directly elect their 
representatives.330  This is preferable to the second option since, it will 
establish more transparency and accountability.331    
There was no need to introduce a proportional system in Iraq in the 
first place to include Shiite, Sunni, and Kurds in the legislative. It seems 
those who planned the Iraqi electoral process were indeed experts 
completely detached from the Iraqi context—even detached from the 
obvious Iraqi demographic and geographic distribution. Since, given the 
fact that Kurds are concentrated in the north and inhabitant almost 
                                                             
327 Blais.  255 & 256.  And:  Stone 298 ―legislators face voters in single-member 
districts and stand and fall on their individual records.‖  
 
328 Ibid. 256. 
 
329 Ibid. 256. 
 
330 Allawi. 
 
331 Blais. 256. 
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purely three provinces, Sunnis are concentrated in the west and center of 
Iraq, and Shiites in the south, even majoritarian elections by default, 
would have included Sunni, Shiites and Kurds in parliament. 
Minorities under this system—groups other than Sunni, Shiite, and 
Kurds—have a personalized vote, where Iraq as a whole will be a single 
district for them.332  This will enable these minorities to reach the quota 
necessary for representation.  Also, the dedication of a certain number of 
seats for women—not less than one-quarter of the members of the 
Council of Representatives333—can follow the same principle.334  Only 
then, will women be truly represented, and a group dynamic of women‘s 
movement will start; instead of the 25% minimum quota for participation 
of women in the Iraqi parliament,335 that is currently controlled and 
manipulated by politically motivated fundamentalist groups.336  Women 
today are excluded from the decision and policy-making processes.337  At 
                                                             
332 Stone.  359 & 360 ―in a society where race is an important dividing line and a factor 
that deeply shape people‘s political views, minorities may need representatives of their 
own race.‖ 
 
333 "Iraqi Constitution", United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq 
http://www.uniraq.org/documents/iraqi_constitution.pdf (accessed 04/20/ 2009).  
Article 49, Fourth.  
 
334 Stone.  360 ―where gender is an important determinant of political power and policy 
attitudes, men may not adequately represent women.‖ 
 
335 III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 385. 
 
336 "The Codepink Report on Iraq: Iraqi Women under Siege ", Act Together 
http://www.acttogether.org/codepink.htm#report (accessed 02/27/ 2009).  And: Nancy 
Trejos, "Women Lose Ground in the New Iraq," The Washington Post, 12/16/ 2006.  
And: Ghali Hassan, "How the U.S. Erase Women‘s Rights in Iraq," Global Research  
(2005). http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=1054 [accessed 
05/05/2009]. 
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best, the participation of women in the Iraqi political process—as it is 
today—is nominal.338  The tradeoff appears to be that females who join 
political entities enjoy the privileges and financial benefits of their posts 
in exchange for overlooking the gender-biased acts and policies, or acting 
indifferently towards women‘s sufferings.339  Only such a quota—which 
provide for women to directly elect their women representatives, rather 
than risking manipulation of the women‘s quota by some political 
entities—will provide genuine representation for women.  Then women 
will also be able to enjoy the same prospects of legitimacy, and 
transparency, and at the same time they‘ll face the scrutiny of their 
constituents, as the proposed system provides in general.   
The second but less favorable option for elections to the legislative is 
the open list proportional representation that enables voters to vote for a 
particular party,340 and at the same time choose from within the party 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
337 "Women‘s Political Exclusion", Hunt Alternatives Fund 
http://www.huntalternatives.org/pages/7630_women_s_political_exclusion.cfm?search
term=iraqi_women (accessed 02/27/ 2009).  And:  Hassan.  And:  Trejos. 
 
338 Trejos.  And:  Hassan.  And:  "Background on Women's Status in Iraq Prior to the 
Fall of the Saddam Hussein Government", Human Rights Watch 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/wrd/iraq-women.htm (accessed 05/02/ 
2009). 
 
339 Arwa Damon, "Violations of 'Islamic Teachings' Take Deadly Toll on Iraqi Women," 
CNN, 02/08/ 2008.  And:  "Women's Rights Activist Beheaded in Iraq," CNN, 12/18/ 
2008.  And:  "Greater Efforts Needed to Boost Women‘s Rights in Iraq, Says Un", U.N. 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=30120&Cr=women&Cr1=iraq 
(accessed 05/05/ 2009).  And:  "Unami: Human Rights in Iraq a Concern," UPI, 04/29/ 
2009. 
 
340 Blais. 248. And: Norris, Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior. 55 
Single Transferable Vote: ―Can be classified as proportional because of the use of the 
quota for election, under this system, each country is divided into multimember 
constituencies that each have about four or five representatives.  Parties forward as 
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list the candidates they wish to represent them.341  This is a compromise 
that reconciles parties‘, and voters‘ interests.342  This system is a 
compromise between entrenched and strong party elites on one side, and 
the more accurate representation of voters from the other side.343  
Another advantage of this system is that it entails competition even 
among party members, which is conducive to democracy.344  However, it 
is not as transparent as the first choice, and does not entail the same 
levels of accountability. 
To further enhance the balance between voters and strong elites—
that might create problems—the presidency council can stay as it is 
now.345  At present, the presidency council in Iraq—which will give over 
power to a President in the next elections—consists of a President and 
two Vice Presidents.346 The presidency council‘s members are 
representatives of the three major components of the Iraqi society—
Shiite, Sunni, and, Kurd.  This can remain unchanged, voted in by 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
many candidates as they thing could win in each constituency.  Voters rank their 
preferences among candidates in an ordinal fashion.…‖ 
 
341 Blais. 
 
342 Pierson.  116 to account for the ―volatile circumstances‖ and accommodate 
entrenched interests.  & 137 ―‗layering, ‗… leaving some elements of institutions in 
place.‖ 
 
343 Blais. 249. 
 
344 Ibid. 249 ―candidates to attract personal support and to discourage support for other 
candidates of their party.‖ 
 
345 Pierson. 116 to account for the ―volatile circumstances‖ and accommodate 
entrenched interests; 137 ―‗layering,‘ … leaving some elements of institutions in place.‖ 
 
346 "Iraqi Constitution",   (accessed).  (Article 138 First, Second, & Fourth). 
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parliament.  In fact, preserving this would form another check on the 
strong Prime Minister proposed under this system. As such, 
transparency, accountability, decisiveness, and cohesion, will be 
combined with oversight.  This will also—to restricted extents—preserve 
the interests of parties and the interests of elites, which will in turn 
reduce the resistance of these parties and elites to the proposed change.   
One issue remains of concern, the number of votes required to 
elect a representative to the legislature.  For, ―enlarging too much the 
number of electors, that renders the representatives too little acquainted 
with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it 
too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to 
comprehend national objects.‖347 This issue must be carefully scrutinized 
and its remedy calculated to reflect the delicate balance.  Districts must 
be delineated in a way so that candidates will largely compete against 
people of their-own identity.  Hence, candidates will not be able to invoke 
their identities as credentials to win elections.  When possible, it is better 
for electoral districts to be devised to include a minority of people from 
diverse ethnic, sectarian, and religious backgrounds. This will foster 
conciliatory approaches by candidates in mixed districts to maximize 
their votes. 
                                                             
347 Madison.  63 ―The Federalist No. 10 - To the People of the State New York.‖ 
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Establishing thresholds and means to ensure unity of action in the 
Iraqi government was a worry that Condoleezza Rice voiced before the 
Iraqi political system was designed by the CPA and the UN.  She 
wondered whether the Iraqi electoral system ―‗could have vote thresholds‘ 
… to avoid a future Iraqi parliament splintered into bickering factions.‖348  
Paul Bremer seconded such a proposition,349  and it is understandable 
why he did not work to employ such a system.  Rather, he went on to 
institutionalize a system that would promote such ―bickering factions.‖ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
348 III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 73. 
 
349 Ibid. 73. 
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Conclusion  
Under the current system in Iraq, grievances are rampant.  Judged 
by its outcomes, the implemented system is clearly not functioning.350 
The security situation and everything else with it have deteriorated as the 
political process progressed.351  To name only one deficiency, it took 
several months to form a government352 after both Iraqi national 
elections353  since the interests of different factions and parties had to be 
reconciled.354  Finally, only with American interventions was it possible 
to bridge the gap between the interests of the elites, and even then, only 
a government of irreconcilable differences was formed, and a national 
dispute government emerged.  And while the several parties were busy 
pursuing their narrow interests, the interests of the people were left out.   
If this time of squabbling, power plays, and maneuverings had been 
invested in several rounds of elections—the down side of the proposed 
                                                             
350 March and Olsen. 738 ―modern perspective in political science has generally given 
primacy to outcomes and either ignored symbolic actions or seen symbols as part of 
manipulative efforts to control outcomes, rather than the other way around.‖  &  741  
and: "Iraq Faces 'Tough Challenges' Despite Peaceful Vote", One World 
http://us.oneworld.net/article/359913-iraqis-undertake-violence-free-provincial-
elections (accessed 03/01/ 2009). 
 
351 Karam.  3   and:  Schwarz.  56&57  and: Galbraith. 3  and: Kenneth Katzman, Crs 
Report for Congress -  Iraq: Government Formation and Performance (2007).  2 
 
352 Hazan.  The same happened in Israel which indicates that the implemented system 
has something to do with such a shortcoming 27 ―Due to the difficulties incurred in the 
formation of governments in Israel since the end of one-party dominance, especially 
during the 1980s, attempts at electoral reform finally began to receive serious 
consideration. Weak government came to be perceived as a possible threat to the 
continued existence of Israel's democracy.‖ 
 
353 Galbraith. 3. 
 
354 Katzman.  2. 
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system—at least the end result would have been a strong, legitimate, and 
productive government to serve the interests of the Iraqi people.  
Moreover, under the current system there is no accountability, because 
people do not know who represents them—to punish or reward them, or 
even to protest their grievances to,—nor do even politicians know who 
they represent, this is why buck passing is the norm that has come to 
define governance and politics in Iraq. 
Today progress in Iraq has been attained by creating government[s] 
―inside a government.‖355  Such a progress has only been achieved 
through ―bypassing‖356 formal institutions to overcome fragmentation 
and relying on undemocratic informal institutions.357  Whether or not 
one agrees with the proposed system, at least it  channels the 
consolidation of the state and its governance through democratic 
institutions, and provides for a strong state that is a guarantor for 
democracy;358 rather than an increasingly stronger state attained at the 
expense of democratic progress, if not in exchange of 
authoritarianism.359 
                                                             
355 Abdul-Ahad. 
 
356 Ibid. 
 
357 Bunce. 713 ―New democracies often exhibit a considerable gap between formal 
institutions, which meet democratic standards, and informal practices, which do not.‖ 
 
358 Ibid. 714 ―Without rule of law, democracy cannot be fully realized … A strong state, 
in short, is a guarantor of democracy—much as it is a guarantor of capitalism.‖ 
 
359 Abdul-Ahad. 
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Furthermore, under the current system—even with the closed 
party list, proportional representation—there are no institutional 
guarantees and mechanisms to ensure a voice for all the major 
components of the Iraqi society in choosing the executive.  Once the 
American mediations cease to exist, if one faction cannot reach the two 
thirds majority requirement—that the Iraqi constitution necessitate to 
form a government,—360 then this faction can form a government by 
extending a deal to another faction, completely excluding the third.361  
For example, Sunni and Shiite blocs in the parliament can agree to form 
a government and exclude the Kurds, or Kurds and Shiite can agree to 
form a government and exclude Sunnis.  Naturally, this is a recipe for a 
civil war. 
To be sure, the system proposed by this study has shortcomings.  
It is complex, and, necessitates great efforts and preparations.362  
Nevertheless, the efforts and the complexity of the proposed system are 
insignificant when compared to the human and financial losses in Iraq 
resulting from the shortcomings of the current system.  Even worse, 
after-all of these human and financial costs Iraq is still not on the right 
track. For without the life-supporting governance machines—the 
presence of the MNFI and the imposed benchmarks that attempt to 
                                                             
360 "Iraqi Constitution",   (accessed).  Article 70 (First) & (Second). 
 
361 Ibid.,   (accessed). Article 70 (First) & (Second), And: Article 76 (First). 
 
362 Kerwin. 151. 
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enforce spoon-fed concepts like revenue sharing, reconciliation, 
transparency, etc—the system does not seem to function.363 
The proposed solution is intended to allow for the alteration of 
elites, and the introduction of new elites through changing the official 
―rules of the game.‖364  It promotes moderates365 that believe in the 
objectives of the change that took place in Iraq in 2003.366  It also 
promotes elites with no sectarian and ethnic biases, and thus enables 
the prevalence of the rule of law,367 rather than patronage.368  As General 
Peter Pace stated, ―absent Iraqi leaders prepared to step up and do hard 
                                                             
363 "Transcript of President Bush‘s Address to the Nation on U.S. Policy in Iraq." 
 
364 Stone. 284  and:  Pierson. 10  and: Mettler and Soss. 59 ―‗New institutionalists‘ of 
various stripes explore how institutional arrangements and the "rules of the game" 
structure the political agenda and shape policy design and enactment … The literature 
explains how political rules and preexisting policies shape the actions of public officials 
and interest groups, but it says little about the ways those same factors influence 
political thought and action in the citizenry.‖ 
 
365 Hazan. 28 ―It was also hoped that majoritarian elections would help nurture and 
promote moderate candidates, reduce the extreme multiparty nature of Israel's party 
system.‖ 
 
366 "Transcript of President Bush‘s Address to the Nation on U.S. Policy in Iraq."  ―teams 
bring together military and civilian experts to help local Iraqi communities pursue 
reconciliation, strengthen the moderates, and speed the transition to Iraqi self-reliance.‖ 
 
367 Allawi.  ―Building democracy in Iraq … process, established through the rule of law, 
a stable security environment, functioning state institutions and an emerging civil 
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needed to provide for an Iraqi democracy with a parliament and government that are 
receptive to people‘s needs. Only then can we build a country that will finally allow us 
to enjoy the freedom so many have paid for with their lives.‖ 
 
368 Dagher, "Iraqi Report on Corruption Cites Prosecutors‘ Barriers."  And:  Myers.  
―ecurity forces, despite significant improvements, remain hobbled by shortages of men 
and equipment, by bureaucracy, corruption, political interference and security breaches 
that have resulted in the deaths of dozens of Iraqi and American troops already this 
year. 
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things, we can‘t succeed.‖369  The proposed system will introduce elites 
who carry the strategic objective of OIF in their hearts, and who will 
strive pursue it, with no need for pressures.  Thus, democratization and 
reform in Iraq will be sustainable, and self-reinforcing. 
It is very difficult to adequately emphasize the importance of 
forcing candidates to appeal to cross-factional constituencies, for this will 
promote moderates and preempt any factional attempt to forge interest-
based coalitions.  Under the proposed system, it will be imperative for the 
executive to win-over cross (party, ethnic, and religious) constituencies to 
ensure maximum consolidation of his or her powers.   
The suggested system will force empowered elites to hold 
accountable all outlaws, sabotages, terrorists, without political, ethnic, 
and, sectarian meddling—a great hurdle for the coalition efforts in 
establishing the rule of law, 370 and heed to the people‘s needs. 
The proposed system also compensates for the immaturity of the 
institutions in Iraq that liberal and institutional democracies necessitate.  
This compensation is actualized by creating direct relations, checks, and 
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370 "Transcript of President Bush‘s Address to the Nation on U.S. Policy in Iraq." ―In 
earlier operations, political and sectarian interference prevented Iraqi and American 
forces from going into neighborhoods that are home to those fueling the sectarian 
violence. This time, Iraqi and American forces will have a green light to enter those 
neighborhoods.‖  And: Woodward. 256 George Bush‘s complains to Al-Maliki. 
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balances among the government branches and most importantly among 
the governing and the governed.371   
Governance under such a system is the purest form of 
democracy,372 where the people are the sovereigns and give a portion of 
their sovereignty to the government to promote the aggregate interests.  
The proposed system also allows for the voices, fears, and concerns of all 
Iraqis—whether Sunni, Shiite, Kurds and/or other minorities—to have a 
determinant say in their government; in the mean time it allows for unity 
of command once voters have casted their decision, and allows for the 
formation of governments that are ―adequate to the exigencies‖373 of Iraq. 
Such a system, in short, will be the first step and the foundation to 
form in Iraq ―a functioning democracy that polices its territory, upholds 
the rule of law, respects fundamental human liberties, and answers to its 
people.‖374 The proposed system facilitates completing the transition to 
democracy in Iraq, and then consolidating it democracy.  The current 
                                                             
371 Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern 
Europe and Latin America.  9, 10, 11, 16 & 19.  And:  Tilly.  11 – 14.  And: Linz and 
Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South 
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372 Blais. 247 ―the majority principle is at the heart of democracy.‖  And: Hazan. 28 ―The 
direct popular election of the Prime Minister was thus adopted in the hope of not only 
rectifying the faults that had become apparent in the 1980s, but also creating a more 
stable and efficient system of government. The new system would return the choice of 
chief executive to the voters, which in itself held intrinsic democratic appeal, and would 
also grant the Prime Minister both a mandate and legitimacy.‖ 
 
373 Solberg. 55 & 59 [Proceedings of the Commissioners to Remedy Defects of the 
Federal Government]. See also: 60 & 61 ―The Virginia Resolution October 16, 1786;‖ & 
62 ―The Delaware Resolution February 3, 1787.‖ 
 
374 "Transcript of President Bush‘s Address to the Nation on U.S. Policy in Iraq." 
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system also leaves little room for elites to maneuver and thwart the 
electors‘ choice, or democracy itself, since interferences for non-
democratically elected people will be increasingly difficult. 
Very importantly the proposed remedy is a mechanical one.375  For, 
―there is certainly persuasive evidence that electoral rules have important 
mechanical effects as they help to determine which candidates are 
elected to parliament and which parties enter government.‖376 Such a 
mechanical remedy has two advantages: first, it will not induce rejection 
other kind of intervention stimulate.377 Rather than imposing 
benchmarks—an imposition that is increasingly unwelcomed by the 
increasingly assertive Iraqi elites,378—the proposed system sets a path for 
swift development, through promoting cohesiveness, accountability, and 
transparency in the Iraqi government, and by devising mechanisms to 
                                                             
375 Stone. 354 & 367 ―Mechanic the metaphor suggests taking our policy problems to a 
mechanic rather than fighting them out in a political contest. By focusing on ends 
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questions of power.  Problems of authority are converted into a matter of technical 
requirement.‖  And: 285 ―rules are indirect commands that work over time … rather 
than being told directly to each person in every situation that the rules cover.  They 
apply to a broad class of actions as ‗standing orders.‘‖   And: Norris, Electoral 
Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior.  5  
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President Joseph R. Biden Jr. that the United States would have to be ‗more aggressive‘ 
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remarks. ‗The Iraqi government knows what its responsibilities are. We are carrying out 
reform, and we are in the last step of reconciliation.‘‖  And:  "Iraq's Maliki Says Biden 
Criticism "Out of Date"," Reuters, 02/10/ 2009. 
 
378 Santora and Cowell.  And: "Iraq's Maliki Says Biden Criticism "Out of Date"." 
89 
 
empower moderate political elites—who believe in these benchmarks as 
principles—that will voluntarily push forward for such benchmarks. In 
short, the proposed system will empower elites that are democrats at 
heart to complete the Iraqi transition democracy and to consolidate this 
democracy.379 Second, the proposed system possesses the characteristics 
of ―institutional resilience‖ which make the reforms, and the 
sustainability they intend to promote, long lasting.380 
Electoral arrangements must be adapted to the circumstances of 
each state.381 There are no magic formulas—a one size fit all remedies.  
The proposed remedy is the swiftest way to introduce a genuine and 
sustainable democracy in Iraq,382 because it takes into account the 
specificities of the Iraqis context.  Traditional and charismatic authority 
is an inherent feature of developing societies in general, and Iraq in 
particular,383 it is only logical that such a model will promote natural 
                                                             
379 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. 4, 5, 71, & 72. 
 
380 Stone.  355 ―based on the metaphor of mechanism: the content of decisions is 
shaped by the structure of a process in a seemingly automatic fashion.‖   And:  Pierson. 
142. 
 
381 Paris. 84.  And: Gunther. 836 & 837. 
 
382 Solberg. 347 The Preamble of [The Constitution of the United States] ――We the people 
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born leaders.384  The proposed system introduces democratic systems 
that rely heavily on the very charismatic factors demanded by the 
cultural characteristics of developing countries, though, the charismatic 
Chief Executive will also be accountable to the public.  After all, national 
interest, popularity, and performance will be the factors that enable the 
Executive to achieve success.385 
Taking the opportunity to promote such a proposed system seems 
timely and appropriate,386 since social actors, and key decision making 
figures have learned through experimentation, contestation and trial and 
error that the current system is flawed.387 Furthermore, the convergence 
of several factors388 has created a ―window of opportunity‖389 to 
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International Center for Scholars, 2002). 6. 
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and Consequences."  3 the natural focus on the highest elective office and implies that 
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385 Ibid. 28 and 30. 
 
386 Hoagland.  And: Jim Muir, "Democracy Takes Root in Iraq," BBC, 02/08/ 2009. 
 
387 Colin J Bennetii and Micahel Howleti, "The Lessons of Learning: Reconciling 
Theories of Policy Learning and Policy Change," Policy Sciences 25 no. 3 (1992). 277,  
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do little more than pay salaries.‖   Woodward. 187, 188, 191, 200, & 223 Lee Hamilton‘s 
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that become joined at particular point in time.‖ And:  Hall and Taylor. 942 ―junctures.‖ 
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promulgate forward such a proposal.  These factors are: (a) the shift in 
American focus from mainly military and security aspects to an approach 
that focuses more on political reforms, (b) the calls from several current 
and former Iraqi elites for a political reform, and (c) the strong indication 
that the Iraqi general public is prone for a stronger, and, nationalistic 
government.390     
However, the changes will face opposition by the same political 
elites that this proposal would oust.391 Therefore, external shock 
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Minister Nouri al-Maliki for his forceful action against extremist militias and his secular 
nationalist agenda—and punished religious parties perceived as too sectarian or too 
close to Iran. The nonsectarian alliance of former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi also 
appears to have done well, and nationalist Sunnis gained influence in areas where they 
had lacked it because of previous election boycotts. In short, Iraq appears to have taken 
a step toward becoming the moderate Arab democracy that the Bush administration 
long hoped for.‖   And: Rubin, "Secular Parties and Premier Lead in Iraq ". ―The relative 
success of the secular parties may be a sign that a significant number of Iraqis are 
disillusioned with the religious parties that have been in power but have done little to 
deliver needed services. Well-known incumbent parties also did well … Maithem 
Hussein, the head of an nongovernment organization tracking the election in Basra, 
said Mr. Maliki‘s victory there was expected. ―Maliki has saved Basra from militias,‖ he 
said. ―Basra owes him.‖ … Several politicians said the strong showing by Mr. Allawi‘s 
party was notable. ―This really reflects that Iraqi society is looking for alternatives — 
they do not necessarily believe that the Islamists should lead the country,‖ said Qassim 
Daoud, a member of Parliament and one of the leaders of an independent, secular-
leaning party. ―The public are interested in services, and this election has shown them 
that they can change anything by democratic means if they are not satisfied.‖  And: 
Zelikow,   (accessed). ―Incidentally, this means that Maliki's old party, Dawa, is molting 
its old shell and becoming the new ‗state of law‘ party, standing for nationalism, central 
power, and modern services.‖  And: Yacoub. ―For years, al-Maliki himself had a 
reputation as a hard-line Shiite nationalist. But there are signs the public, especially in 
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dominated national politics since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003.‖ 
 
391 Hazan. 25 ―When it became apparent that the adoption of constituency-based 
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(perhaps better translated as American intervention) will be necessary.392  
Admittedly, this interventional role has a moral aspect as well as a 
functional one since the system was imposed—not against the wish of 
Iraqi people, but because of their lack of experience.     
The longer it takes to realize the need to reform the political and 
electoral process to achieve the initial objectives of OIF, the ―more 
resilient‖ these institutions will become, and the harder it will be to 
introduce the necessary reforms.393  If such changes are not pushed 
forward soon, the opportunity might be ―irretrievably lost.‖394 
Failure in Iraq is not an option, not only for Iraqis but also for 
America.395  The importance of succeeding in Iraq transcends respective 
party cleavages and different presidential approaches.396  Even though 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
government, was not politically possible, the chances for the second reform package 
diminished.‖ & 26 ―However, the direct election of the Prime Minister would have to 
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393 Pierson. 147. 
 
394 Ibid. 11. 
 
395 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, (National Security Council (NSC), 2005). 1  and: 
"President Bush Addresses Nation on Iraq War," The Washington Post, 01/10/ 2007. 
―one message came through loud and clear: Failure in Iraq would be a disaster for the 
United States.‖   And: III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 339. 
 
396 III and others, The Iraq Study Group Report.  8 ―Because of the gravity of Iraq‘s 
condition and the country‘s vital importance, the United States is facing one of its most 
difficult and significant international challenges in decades.‖  9  ―Iraq is vital to regional 
and even global stability.‖  And: Biddle, O'Hanlon, and Pollack. 27. 
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the American public opinion may be against such a policy of commitment 
to Iraq, sustaining the policy of commitment to winning the war in Iraq 
while modifying the approach to win the war is vital to the short and 
long-term US interests.397  In short, this issue is as vital for America as it 
is for Iraq.398 The sacrifices will be appreciated—by both Iraqis and 
Americans—once the strategic objective of OIF is attained.  From here on, 
this study will summarize the important reasons that explain why 
attaining the strategic objective of OIF is vital to Americans—as it has 
shown how attaining the strategic objective of OIF is vital for the 
interests of Iraqis.  Commitment to Iraq is a vital matter for American for 
at least three reasons: 
 First, the security of the United States is at stake and is correlated 
to the victory in Iraq.  In recent history, America abandoned Afghanistan, 
leaving it unstable.  The consequences were that Afghanistan became a 
den for terrorists who used the state as a platform for attacks directed 
against America and its allies. The attacks resulted in the loss of 
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viewed in the region and around the world.‖  28 ―The global standing of the United 
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398 III and others, The Iraq Study Group Report. 27 ―If the situation in Iraq continues to 
deteriorate, the consequences could be severe for Iraq, the United States, the region, 
and the world.‖   
94 
 
thousands of American lives, not to mention the financial losses and the 
loss of America‘s sense of security.399   
 Losing the war in Iraq would be far more consequential.400  Iraq is 
strategically located in the heart of the Middle East; possesses enormous 
resources; and is of high cultural, historical, and, religious value to 
Muslims.401 These considerations would make losing the war in Iraq 
catastrophic.402   
If America cuts and runs from Iraq, then Iraq will fall into the 
hands of the enemies of the US.403  This will give those who hate America 
a strategic location, enormous resources, and a strong case to mobilize 
Muslims around the world against America.404   
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 Second, securing America‘s energy necessitates that the US stays 
the course in Iraq until Iraq is completely stable, and democratic.  The 
importance of Iraq in this regard can be summarized as follows: 
I. America, according to the most optimistic estimates will not be able to 
achieve energy independence in less than ten years. Hence, 
independence from the Middle East will not be attained on the short and 
mid-term.  Therefore, the strategic vitality of the Middle East in general 
and Iraq in particular will continue to be a pressing issue, 405 even to 
enable America and Americans to carry on their daily lives (see figure 
4).406    
II. The oil peak is estimated to occur within a few years if, as some 
calculate, it has not already occurred.  The US is the largest consumer of 
oil in the world; it imports 25% of the world‘s oil production.  Iraq, on the 
other hand, has oil resources, the second proven oil reserves.407  To 
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make it more interesting, reports indicate that there are untapped, newly 
found oil reserves in Iraq.408  The finding triples the estimates of Iraqi oil 
reserves and places Iraq as the world‘s wealthiest country in terms of oil 
reserves.409   
Globally, the demand on oil is soaring, and supply is limited; the 
competition over oil resources is escalating,410 and is destined to become 
more and more heated.411 The rising demand on energy resources is a 
strategic threat to the US.  Therefore, the United States needs to secure 
access to the world‘s oil supplies.  Otherwise, the US will have to fight 
much bloodier wars—all out wars—under far less favorable 
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circumstances.412 Thus, the vitality of Iraqi-American friendly relations 
becomes apparent.413 To maintain such relations—friendly relations,—a 
democratic Iraq, where moderates, as opposed to fundamentalists are 
leveraged, is also apparent.   
Third, Iraq is demographically, historically, and culturally, linked 
to the whole Middle East region. 414  Any failure in Iraq will have a 
domino effect throughout the region.415  And since the Middle East is a 
vital yet very volatile region,416 any destabilization will disrupt energy 
supplies to the world, and spike security threats,417 for, the three major 
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oil producers in the world are in the Middle East, and the largest portion 
of the world‘s oil supplies comes from the Middle East (see figure 5).418       
Over and above, pentagon strategists have defined the ―arc of 
crisis‖ that stretches from ―Central and South America and spreads 
through North Africa, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia.‖  
This arc defines the primary threat to US security in the 21st century. 419  
The Middle East is this arc‘s ―central core. Its strategic position is 
unequalled … it holds in its subsoil about three-fourths of the proven 
and estimated world oil reserves, and it is the locus of one of the most 
intractable conflicts of the twentieth century ….‖420  Iraq lies in the heart 
of the Middle East and, is the second largest Arab country in the Gulf in 
terms of territory and oil reserves.  Thus, losing Iraq would constitute a 
fatal strike to American security, economy, and status in world. 
Furthermore, it is very important to keep in mind that the most 
important strategy to counterterrorism is to dry the pool of terrorists‘ 
supporters, sympathizers, and, recruits.  Losing Iraq would produce the 
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exact opposite and give a major boost to the terrorists‘ cause421 for two 
reasons: First, Terrorists always emphasize that this is a war of believers 
and non-believers,422 and cite their victory over the mighty Soviet 
Union.423  As such, terrorists keep insuring their supporters and 
sympathizers that there is no reason to believe that America also will not 
be defeated, just as the Soviets.424  If such a scenario comes true, then 
the terrorists‘ way of life and thinking will resonate with many more 
Arabs and Muslims as the true way,425 the way that all the other 
regimes, and approaches, failed to achieve.426  ―Al Qaeda will portray any 
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failure by the United States in Iraq as a significant victory, one that will 
be featured prominently as they recruit for their cause in the region and 
around the world.‖427 Hence, their ideology will spread like fire in hay.428  
Second, Iraq lies in the heart of the Middle East.  Its capital, Baghdad, 
was the capital of the largest Arabic/Islamic Caliphate.  Many Muslims 
around the world carry strong sentiments for Iraq.  The holiest shrines to 
Shiite Muslims are in Iraq.  Terrorists rally supporters by emphasizing 
the intentions of Americans as harboring dubious goals towards the 
Islamic world, and that it intends to divide and weaken the Muslim 
world.429 Hence, if Iraq fails as a state and shatters into pieces, 
extremists will use this as a proof to the Muslim world that America 
harbors the worst intentions towards Muslims, and targets the holiest 
and most intimate places to Muslims.  These groups will have a very 
strong case, backed by evidence, to mobilize Muslims from around the 
world430 against the West in general and the US in particular.   Terrorists 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
426 III and others, The Iraq Study Group Report. 28  ―A chaotic Iraq could provide a still 
stronger base of operations for terrorists who seek to act regionally or even globally. Al 
Qaeda will portray any failure by the United States in Iraq as a significant victory that 
will be featured prominently as they recruit for their cause in the region and around the 
world. Ayman al-Zawahiri, deputy to Osama bin Laden, has declared Iraq a focus for al 
Qaeda: they will seek to expel the Americans and then spread ‗the jihad wave.‘‖ 
 
427 Ibid. 28. 
 
428 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq.  5  ―a decisive victory over the United States, 
vindicating their tactics of beheadings, suicide bombings, and ruthless intimidation of 
civilians, inviting more deadly attacks against Americans and other free people across 
the globe.‖ 
 
429 III and others, The Iraq Study Group Report. 31. 
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will be able to rally people against any policy that America ever seeks to 
pursue in the Muslim world and in the vital region of the Middle East.  
Consequently, the United States will never be able to mobilize a single 
soldier or have a hope for success in the Islamic world,431 nor will it be 
able to advance any policy after failing in Iraq and failing it. On the other 
hand, if the US abandons Iraq before the transition is completed, and 
democracy is consolidated; then, even if Iraq remains a single unit, it will 
fall in the hands of fundamentalist groups that will not only enslave432 
Iraqis and jeopardize their prospects for decent life,433 freedom,434  
liberty,435 and democracy,436 but will also be extremely hostile to the 
United States.   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
430 Ibid. 31 Iraqis, particularly Sunni Arabs, told us that such a division would confirm 
wider fears across the Arab world that the United States invaded Iraq to weaken a 
strong Arab state. 
 
431 Ibid. 28   ―Perceived failure there could diminish America‘s credibility and influence 
in a region that is the center of the Islamic world and vital to the world‘s energy supply. 
This loss would reduce America‘s global influence.‖  And:  National Strategy for Victory 
in Iraq.  1  ―Middle East reformers would never again fully trust American assurances of 
support for democracy and human rights in the region – a historic opportunity lost.‖  & 
5 ―A failed state and source of instability for the entire Middle East, with all the 
attendant risks and incalculable costs for American security and prosperity.‖  & 6 
―Weakened the growing democratic impulses in the region. Middle East reformers would 
never again fully trust American assurances of support for democracy and pluralism in 
the region – a historic opportunity, central to America‘s long-term security, forever lost.‖ 
 
432 Greene. 424 & 425 ―A New Prospect in Human Affairs‖: Richard Price, ―Observation 
on the importance of the American Revolution‖ (1784). ―… the consequences will be, 
that he fairest experiment ever tried in human affairs will miscarry; and that a 
REVOLUTION which had revived the hopes of good men and promised an opening to 
better times, will become a discouragement to all future efforts in favour of liberty, and 
prove only an opening to a new scene of human degeneracy and misery.‖ 
 
433 Ibid. 
 
434 Ibid. 
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Hence, imagine, if you will, the disruption of petroleum supplies 
from this region coupled with a much more terrorist-friendly 
environment, and a hatred towards America.  This pretty much defines 
the future of events if the US fails to attain the strategic objective of OIF 
in Iraq.  Reverse the picture, however, and imagine a stable and 
prospering Iraq.  Imagine what the triumph of democracy over extremism 
would mean for American foreign policy and its acceptance, especially in 
a region where the people are hanging in the balance, awaiting for a way 
out of their suffering, into a way of life that improves their status. 
 President Obama campaigned against American presence in Iraq.  
He has maintained that he ―will responsibly end the war in Iraq and 
focus on Afghanistan, the refuge for the terrorists who attacked us on 
September 11.‖  However, terrorists are not tied to a land or restricted by 
nationality.  Their threat is transnational.   Therefore, if Iraq is neglected 
it will be much more devastating since terrorists will then have a strong 
hold in the Middle East, specifically in a country so resourceful and 
strategically located.  In such a scenario, the impact of the Afghan-Arab 
phenomena and the September 11 attacks will be minor compared with 
what could happen if Iraq becomes a safe haven for terrorists.  America, 
will then have to return to Iraq under less favorable circumstances just 
as they did in Afghanistan.  As such, this study have tried to summarize 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
435 Ibid. 
 
436 Ibid. 
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the reasons, why America, to serve its own interests—that also coincide 
with Iraqi national interests as shown throughout this study—must 
maintain its commitment to Iraq until the strategic objective of OIF is 
materialized. 
 Finally, people must not lose sight of the fact that Iraq is still in 
transition from dictatorship. Transitions are not cakewalks; they are 
thorny and complicated processes.437  It has been six years since the 
overthrow of Saddam‘s regime and the transition from dictatorship.  Six 
years is shorter time period than the actual allied occupation of Japan, 
which took seven years.438  America has a moral responsibility towards a 
country inhabited by 27 million citizens, for it responsible for forcing the 
change that took place in Iraq.439 
                                                             
437 O'Donnell and Schmitter. 3-6, & 10. 
 
438 Sodaro. 267. 
 
439 III and others, The Iraq Study Group Report. 9 ―Because events in Iraq have been set 
in motion by American decisions and actions, the United States has both a national and 
a moral interest in doing what it can to give Iraqis an opportunity to avert anarchy.‖  
And: William R. Slomanson, Fundamental Perspectives on International Law, 5th ed. 
(Thomson Wadsworth, 2007). 271-273.  Also see: Robert Kagan, "Neocon Nation: 
Neoconservatism, C. 1776", World Affairs Journal 
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/2008%20-%20Spring/full-neocon.html (accessed). 
―Washington Post/ABC News poll in April 2003 found that, … more than 70 percent of 
Americans supported the war, and a CBS poll revealed that 60 percent of Americans 
believed it had been worth the sacrifice even if no weapons of mass destruction were 
ever found. A month later, a Gallup poll found that 79 percent of Americans considered 
the war justified with or without conclusive evidence that Saddam Hussein had 
possessed weapons of mass destruction, and only 19 percent believed the discovery of 
such weapons was necessary to justify the war. The nation‘s political leaders were 
similarly supportive up to that point. The key vote in the Senate in the fall of 2002 
passed 77-23, with 29 of 50 Democrats voting to authorize the war.‖  And: "Floor 
Speech of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton on S.J. Res. 45, a Resolution to Authorize 
the Use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq, October 10, 2002", Senator Hillary 
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Figure 1 
Figure 2 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Rodham Clinton http://clinton.senate.gov/speeches/iraq_101002.html (accessed 
08/10/ 2008). 
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